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Recent Decision
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
ALLEN v. DACKMAN : DOING AWAY WITH
LIMITED LIABILITY IN MARYLAND
JEFFREY S. QUINN*
In Allen v. Dackman,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
whether an individual member of a limited liability company (“LLC”)
may be held personally liable for the lead paint injuries suffered by
illegal occupants of the LLC’s property.2  The court held that an indi-
vidual member of an LLC could be personally liable under the Balti-
more City Housing Code (“Housing Code”) because the trier of fact
could find that the member was the “owner” of property by “ha[ving]
the ability to change or affect the title” even though the property was
purchased in the name of the LLC and could find that the member
“personally committed, inspired or participated in” the alleged tort.3
The court’s holding jeopardizes the existence of the limited liability
offered by an LLC because the court imposed personal liability on
members for the obligations of the LLC.4  The court instead could
properly hold individuals accountable for their tortious conduct while
respecting the economically important liability shield by undertaking
a three part analysis: (1) interpreting the Housing Code to require the
legal ability to change or affect title,5 (2) interpreting the Maryland
Copyright  2011 by Jeffrey S. Quinn.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law.  The author wishes to
thank Professor Michelle Harner for her invaluable instruction and advice in the develop-
ment of this Note.  The author is also sincerely grateful to the editorial contributions of
Maggie Grace, Stephanie Bignon, Nan Bonifant, and Lauren Genvert.
1. 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).
2. Id. at 135–36, 991 A.2d at 1218.
3. Id. at 141, 145, 991 A.2d at 1221, 1223–24.  References to the Housing Code refer
to the Housing Code as it existed during the relevant time period applicable to Allen v.
Dackman.  In 2002, the Baltimore City Council (“City Council”) repealed Division V of Arti-
cle 13 of the City Code, which comprised the Housing Code.  Council B. 02-0894, 2002
Balt. City Council (Balt. City 2002).  The City Council created the Building, Fire, and Re-
lated Codes of Baltimore City, id., which includes a Property Management Code that now
governs many of the same issues previously covered by the Housing Code. Allen, 413 Md.
at 136 n.3, 991 A.2d at 1218 n.3.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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Limited Liability Company Act (“MLLCA”) to protect members from
liability when acting in the good faith service of the LLC,6 and (3)
applying the well-settled doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to
LLCs.7  If the member fails any of these three steps, then the court
could properly impose personal liability.8  Although this reasoning
would have led to a different outcome in the present case, this analysis
properly weighs the competing interests and would nonetheless hold
an LLC member personally liable in cases with the appropriate facts.9
I. THE CASE
In 1999, Monica D. Allen and her two minor children moved in
with Tracy Allen, the children’s grandmother.10  Sometime later, Mil-
dred Thompkins, the property’s landlord, failed to pay the necessary
property taxes, resulting in the property’s sale in lieu of foreclosure to
Hard Assets, LLC in March 2000.11  At that time, Jay Dackman was one
of two members of Hard Assets.12
When Hard Assets acquired title to the property, none of its
members were aware that Ms. Allen and her children were living at
the premises.13  When the LLC became aware of the Allens’ unautho-
rized use of the property, Hard Assets advised Ms. Allen that she
would have to vacate the premises.14  On August 18, 2000, the District
Court for Baltimore City found that Ms. Allen was wrongfully in pos-
session of the property and entered judgment for Hard Assets.15  On
March 16, 2001, Hard Assets sold the property.16
6. See infra Part IV.B.2.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Allen v. Dackman, 184 Md. App. 1, 4, 964 A.2d 210, 212 (2009), rev’d, 413 Md. 132,
991 A.2d 1216 (2010).  Tracy Allen had resided at the property since the summer of 1998
and was currently leasing the premises from Mildred Thompkins. Id.
11. Id. at 3–5, 964 A.2d at 211–12.  Hard Assets was in the business of “flipping” real
estate: The LLC would buy properties encumbered by tax liens and then place the prop-
erty back on the market for sale. Id.
12. Id.  Over the fifteen years of Dackman’s history with purchasing tax liens, he made
a practice of selling all properties “as is,” never intending to lease the property in question.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4–5, 964 A.2d at 212.  Hard Assets gave Ms. Allen thirty days to vacate the
premises. Id.  However, after thirty days had passed, Ms. Allen still resided at the property.
Id. at 5, 964 A.2d at 212.
15. Id.  Ms. Allen and her children did not leave the property until they were forcibly
removed on October 23, 2000. Id.
16. Id.
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During the one year period in which the LLC held title to the
property, Hard Assets never received or attempted to collect any rent
for the property, and Ms. Allen never paid rent to live on the prop-
erty.17  During this time, Dackman was responsible for the day-to-day
operations of Hard Assets.18  Dackman was the individual who exe-
cuted the deed for Hard Assets to acquire the property, signed the
complaint to have the Allens removed from the property, and “signed
the deed when Hard Assets sold the property.”19  Dackman, however,
never once visited the property and never intended to lease the prop-
erty to anyone.20
While residing at the property, both of Ms. Allen’s “minor chil-
dren suffered elevated blood-lead levels.”21  The children suffered ele-
vated blood-lead levels before, during, and after Hard Assets held
legal title to the property.22  Both children suffered their highest ele-
vated blood-lead levels during the time in which Hard Assets owned
the property.23  Ms. Allen, as mother and next friend for her two mi-
nor children, filed a complaint against Dackman and Hard Assets in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on June 11, 2002.24
After the close of discovery, Dackman filed a motion for summary
judgment.25  On August 31, 2005, the trial court granted Dackman’s
motion for summary judgment.26  Judge Allison first reasoned that
Dackman could not be held liable as an individual for negligence be-
17. Id.  Not only did Ms. Allen never speak to Hard Assets or Dackman, but Ms. Allen
was never aware that Hard Assets owned the property or that Dackman was a member of
Hard Assets. Id.
18. Id.
19. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 149, 991 A.2d 1216, 1226 (2010).
20. Allen, 184 Md. App. at 4–5, 964 A.2d at 212.
21. Id. at 5, 964 A.2d at 212.  Monica Allen was born on September 8, 1996, and
Shantese Thomas was born on January 23, 1998. Id. at 4, 964 A.2d at 212.
22. Id. at 5, 964 A.2d at 212.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3, 6, 964 A.2d at 211–12.  The complaint alleged that “the minor children
sustained injuries as a result of their exposure to lead-based paint while residing at 3143
Elmora Avenue.” Id. at 3, 964 A.2d at 211.  The complaint further alleged that both de-
fendants had violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) and “were negli-
gent in failing to properly maintain and safeguard the property against the presence of
chipping, flaking, and/or peeling lead-based paint.” Id.
25. Id. at 6, 964 A.2d at 213.  Dackman’s motion for summary judgment, filed on June
25, 2005, disclaimed all individual liability because Dackman (1) did not lease the property
to Ms. Allen, (2) was a member of an LLC, (3) “had no knowledge of the alleged tort,” and
(4) could not be held liable under the MCPA. Id.  A line of dismissals was filed as to Hard
Assets, which was therefore not party to the appeal. Id. at 4 n.2, 964 A.2d at 211 n.2.
26. Allen v. Dackman, No. 24-C-02-003209, 2005 WL 6216355 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 31,
2005), aff’d, 184 Md. App. 1, 964 A.2d 210, rev’d, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).
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cause Hard Assets, not Dackman, held title to the property.27  Second,
the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) was not applicable
because Dackman was not a landlord and never made any actual or
implied representations about the property to the plaintiffs.28  Third,
Dackman was not an owner or operator of the property under the
Housing Code because finding liability against an individual for acting
as an officer of a corporation would be inconsistent with the Housing
Code.29
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the circuit
court was correct in granting Dackman’s motion for summary judg-
ment and affirmed.30  Judge Wright, writing for the court, first rea-
soned that, under the Housing Code, an owner must have “control
over the title itself.”31  The court stated that there was no evidence
that Dackman, as an individual, ever held or had control over the title
to the property.32  Second, the court held that Dackman could not
27. Id. ¶ 6.  Moreover, Judge Allison noted, the plaintiffs made no claim that the court
should pierce the corporate veil of Hard Assets. Id.
28. Id. ¶ 8.  The MCPA has been interpreted by the courts so that “‘[a] landlord must
be held to be aware of all laws concerning the validity of leasing its premises.’” Id. ¶ 7
(quoting Golt v. Philips, 308 Md. 1, 10, 517 A.2d 328, 332 (1986)).  “ ‘As the owner of the
premises and the landlord, on whom the law imposes specific duties and obligations in
connection with the lease of the premises . . . the law imputes the requisite knowledge to
the [landlord].’” Id. (quoting Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 532–33, 750 A.2d 10, 24
(2000)).  The court, however, drew a threshold factual distinction between the precedent
cases under the MCPA and the current case. Id. ¶ 8.  In each of the precedent cases, “the
defendant landlord and plaintiff tenant knowingly entered into a lease, and the Defendant
was a landlord.” Id.  Here, Judge Allison reasoned, Dackman was unaware that the prop-
erty was occupied, that “a lease was ever entered to by the previous owner and Plaintiff, and
he did not collect rent.” Id.
29. Id. ¶ 11–12.  Section 310(a) of the Housing Code required all owners and opera-
tors of property to be in compliance with the Code. BALT., MD., BALT. CITY CODE art. 13,
div. V, § 301(a) (2000) [hereinafter HOUSING CODE] (repealed 2002).  Section 310(b)
placed that responsibility on corporate officers and directors. Id. § 310(b).  Judge Allison
reasoned that “‘[t]o hold a person liable under section 310(a) merely because he or she
was involved in setting up a corporation, or acted as officer or director, would be inconsis-
tent with the requirements of section 310(b).’” Allen, 2005 WL 6216355, ¶ 11 (alteration
in original) (explaining that the plaintiffs only sought to hold Dackman liable under sec-
tion 310(a)).  Judge Allison concluded by relying on precedent that “‘[w]e will not inter-
pret section 310 in a manner that promotes this inconsistency.’” Id.
30. Allen, 184 Md. App. at 8, 10, 964 A.2d at 214–15.  On appeal, the Allens asserted
that Dackman could be held individually liable because Dackman was an “owner” or “oper-
ator” of the property as defined under the Housing Code. Id. at 6–7, 964 A.2d at 213.
31. Id. at 8, 964 A.2d at 214.  Under the Housing Code, “owner” is defined as “any
person, firm, corporation . . . who, alone or jointly or severally with others, owns, holds, or
controls the whole, or any part, of the freehold or leasehold title to any dwelling or dwell-
ing unit, with or without accompanying possession thereof.” HOUSING CODE § 105(jj).
32. Allen, 184 Md. App. at 8, 964 A.2d at 214.  The court explained that because
Dackman “lacked the legal right to sell and convey title to the property, it follows that
[Dackman] was not an ‘owner’ for purposes of the Housing Code.” Id.
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have been an “operator” of the property under the Housing Code.33
The court reasoned that an operator does not begin to have an “obli-
gation” under the Housing Code until the dwelling is first rented for
money.34  In this case, Dackman neither received nor intended to re-
ceive rent for the premises.35  Third, Judge Wright held that Dackman
could not be held personally liable for negligence because the
MLLCA specifically states that no member can be personally liable for
an obligation of the company solely by reason of being a member of
the company.36  Fourth, the MCPA did not apply because the plain-
tiffs were not lessees or recipients of consumer realty.37  The Maryland
Court of Appeals then granted certiorari to determine whether an in-
dividual member of an LLC can be held personally liable for the lead
paint poisoning suffered by illegal occupants of a property owned by
the LLC.38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Three sources of law present Maryland courts with the opportu-
nity to hold an individual member of an LLC personally liable for
alleged torts of the LLC: (1) the Housing Code; (2) the MLLCA; and
(3) the court’s common law doctrines.  First, the Housing Code im-
poses liability upon all owners of property that do not comply with any
provision of the Housing Code.39  Second, the MLLCA protects indi-
vidual members from personal liability to the extent that such liability
arises “solely by reason” of their member status.40  Third, the common
law allows the court to hold individuals liable for the torts of the cor-
33. Id.  Under the Housing Code, “operator” is defined as “any person who has charge,
care or control of a building, or part thereof, in which dwelling units or rooming units are
let or offered for occupancy.” HOUSING CODE § 105(hh).
34. Allen, 184 Md. App. at 8, 964 A.2d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rely-
ing on the specific phase “‘let or offered for occupancy’” within the definition of operator).
35. See id. at 9, 964 A.2d at 214 (explaining that “Hard Assets never intended to lease
the property, nor were its members aware that [Ms. Allen’s children] or Ms. Allen” resided
at the property and that Hard Assets never offered any part of the building for rent, never
entered a lease with Ms. Allen, and never received or attempt to receive rent from Ms.
Allen).
36. Id., 964 A.2d at 215 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-301 (LexisNexis
2007)) (“Thus, [the Allens] cannot succeed in imputing the alleged negligent acts of Hard
Assets to [Dackman].”).
37. Id. at 9–10, 964 A.2d at 215 (explaining that the MCPA is concerned with protect-
ing consumers from “‘deceptive trade practices which induce the prospective tenant to
enter into such a lease’”).  In this case, Judge Wright reasoned that no evidence showed
that Hard Assets ever entered into a lease with Ms. Allen. Id. at 10, 964 A.2d at 215.
38. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 135–36, 991 A.2d 1216, 1218 (2010).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
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poration that they personally commit or direct or to hold an individ-
ual member liable by piercing the corporate veil in cases of fraud or
paramount equity.41
A. The Baltimore City Housing Code
The Housing Code was designed to establish minimum require-
ments for the protection of the health and general welfare of owners
and occupants of dwellings within the City of Baltimore.42  All owners
and operators are required to be in compliance with all provisions of
the Housing Code,43 including the requirement that “[a]ll walls, ceil-
ings, woodwork, doors, and windows shall be . . . free of any flaking,
loose, or peeling paint.”44  To enforce the Housing Code, a prima fa-
cie case of negligence can be made against all individuals qualifying as
an “owner”45 upon a showing (a) of a violation of the Housing Code
that was designed to protect the plaintiff, and (b) that the plaintiff’s
injury was proximately caused by the violation.46
1. The Owner of Property as the Person Who “Owns, Holds, or
Controls” Title
The Housing Code places the duty upon all owners of property to
be in compliance with every provision of the Housing Code.47  The
Housing Code defines an owner as any person who “owns, holds, or
controls” title.48  The Court of Special Appeals is the only Maryland
court that has interpreted the phrase “owns, holds, or controls” title
under the Housing Code.49  The Court of Appeals, however, has inter-
preted a very similar definition of the term owner under the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act (“LPPA”).50
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. HOUSING CODE § 103(a)(1) (stating that the Housing Code was intended to “estab-
lish and maintain basic minimum requirements, standards, and conditions essential for the
protection of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public and of the own-
ers and occupants of dwellings in the City of Baltimore”).
43. Id. § 310(a)(1).
44. Id. § 703(c)(3).  Section 703 of the Housing Code had two section 703(b) provi-
sions.  This Note will treat the second provision, which describes standards for good repair
and safe condition specifically in regard to the interior, as section 703(c).
45. See infra Part II.A.1.
46. See infra Part II.A.2.
47. HOUSING CODE § 310(a)(1).
48. Id. § 105(jj) (stating that an owner is “any person, firm, corporation . . . who, alone
or jointly or severally with others owns, holds, or controls the whole or any part of the
freehold or leasehold title to any dwelling or dwelling unit, with or without accompanying
actual possession thereof”).
49. See infra Part II.A.1.a.
50. See infra Part II.A.1.b.
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a. Interpreting the Term “Owner” Under the Housing Code
The only previous occasion in which a Maryland court has inter-
preted the phrase “owns, holds, or controls” within the meaning of
the Housing Code was in Shipley v. Perlberg.51  In Shipley, the Court of
Special Appeals held that the director and officer of a corporation did
not own, hold, or control title because the director did not have title
to the property and did not “exercise[ ] ownership in the manner
contemplated by the Code.”52  Instead, it was undisputed that the cor-
poration at all relevant times owned the subject property.53
The court also held that the director could not be personally lia-
ble as the owner or operator of the property simply by reason of act-
ing as the director and officer of the corporation.54  The court
compared section 310(a) of the Housing Code with section 310(b).55
In so doing, the court stated that to hold a director or officer liable
under section 310(b), “a plaintiff must show that the individual defen-
dant at least had knowledge of and acquiesced in the wrong commit-
ted.”56  To hold a director or officer “liable under section 310(a)
merely because he or she was involved in setting up a corporation, or
acted as officer or director, would be inconsistent with the require-
ments of section 310(b).”57  Therefore, the director was not an owner
and could not be held personally liable under section 310(a) as own-
ing, holding, or controlling title.58
51. 140 Md. App. 257, 277, 780 A.2d 396, 407 (2001), abrogated by 413 Md. 132, 991
A.2d 1216 (2010).
52. Id. at 277–79, 780 A.2d at 407.  The court also found that the director was not an
“operator” because in not being involved in renting the property and never visiting the
property he did not have “‘charge, care, or control’” as necessary under the Housing
Code. Id. at 278–79, 780 A.2d at 407–08 (quoting HOUSING CODE § 105(hh)).
53. Id. at 277, 780 A.2d at 407 (“There is no evidence that Perlberg had title to the
subject property or exercised ownership in the manner contemplated by the Code.”).
54. Id. at 277–79, 780 A.2d at 407–08.
55. Id. (explaining that section 310(a) imposes liability upon owners and operators
while section 310(b) imposes liability upon directors and officers of corporations).
56. Id. at 278, 780 A.2d at 408.
57. Id.  “[C]ourts must read all parts of a statute together, with a view toward harmoniz-
ing the various parts and avoiding both inconsistencies and senseless results that could not
reasonably have been intended by the Legislature.”  Barr v. State, 101 Md. App. 681, 687,
647 A.2d 1293, 1295–96 (1994).
58. Shipley, 140 Md. App. at 277–79, 780 A.2d at 407–08.
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b. Maryland Courts Have Interpreted the Word “Owner” Under the
Lead Poisoning Prevention Act in a Similar Manner to the
Housing Code
Although the Court of Special Appeals is the only Maryland court
to have dealt with the phrase “owns, holds, or controls” within the
meaning of the Housing Code, the Court of Appeals dealt with a
nearly identical definition of the term “owner” under the LPPA in Dyer
v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co.59  The LPPA similarly defines an owner as
an individual who owns, holds, or controls any part of the property
with or without actual possession.60  The Dyer court began by acknowl-
edging the difference between the terms “to own” and “owner.”61  “To
own” is to “have a legal or rightful title to” or “to possess” the prop-
erty.62  To be an “owner” is to be “a rightful proprietor.”63
Looking to the statutory scheme as a whole, the court believed
that the use of the term “owner” within the LPPA was intended to
“‘appl[y] only to those [individuals] with the right to control the
property.’”64  Under this interpretation, the defendant could not be
held liable simply because of his position as a leasing agent.65  The
court found the mere act of delivering possession of a dwelling to a
tenant along with a purchase agreement did not constitute the re-
quired level of control.66  In addition, the court stated that the leasing
59. 371 Md. 576, 578–79, 810 A.2d 938, 940 (2002). Compare MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR.
§ 6-801(o)(1) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010) (“‘Owner’ means a person, firm, corpora-
tion, guardian, conservator, receiver, trustee, executor, or legal representative who, alone
or jointly or severally with others, owns, holds, or controls the whole or any party of the
freehold or leasehold interest to any property, with or without actual possession.” (empha-
sis added)), with HOUSING CODE § 105(jj) (defining an owner as “any person, firm, corpo-
ration, guardian, conservator, receiver, trustee, executor, or other judicial officer, who . . .
owns, holds, or controls the whole or any part of the freehold or leasehold title to any dwell-
ing or dwelling unit, with or without accompanying actual possession thereof” (emphasis
added)).
60. ENVIR. § 6-801(o)(1).
61. Dyer, 371 Md. at 583, 810 A.2d at 942 (quoting Weinberg v. Balt. & Annapolis R.R.
Co., 200 Md. 160, 166, 88 A.2d 575, 577 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘An owner is not necessarily one owning
the fee-simple, or one having in the property the highest estate it will admit of.’”).  For
example, a mortgagee is considered to be an owner even though legally a mortgagee is
only considered to have a lien on the property. Id.
64. Id. at 588, 810 A.2d at 945–46 (quoting Dyer v. Criegler, 142 Md. App. 109, 117,
788 A.2d 227, 232 (2002)).
65. Id. at 585–87, 810 A.2d at 943–45.  The court stated, “Any other interpretation
would arbitrarily hold property managers and leasing agents to a higher standard than that
to which actual owners of the property are held.” Id. at 585, 810 A.2d at 943.
66. Id. at 590–91, 810 A.2d at 946–47.  The court also stated that “[m]erely because the
respondent was entitled to receive a commission in the event the tenant(s) purchased the
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR407.txt unknown Seq: 9 10-JUN-11 10:44
2011] ALLEN V. DACKMAN 1179
agent could not be held liable as an owner because delivering docu-
ments to a tenant is not sufficient to control the interest to the
property.67
2. Proving Negligence Under the Housing Code
To hold a defendant liable for negligence under the Housing
Code, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defen-
dant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached
that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss; and (4) the
breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the injury.68  The re-
quired duty of care may be prescribed by statute.69  If a duty is created
by statute—for instance, by the Housing Code—the violation of that
statute is considered prima facie evidence of negligence.70  To find
actual negligence, however, the violation of the statute must be the
proximate cause of the injury.71  A violation of the Housing Code will
be the proximate cause of the alleged injury where the “plaintiff is
within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suf-
fered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent.”72
The Housing Code imposes duties upon all individuals who lease
a dwelling for human occupation.73  In general, the Housing Code
prohibits the occupation of any dwelling that is not in conformity with
the entire code.74  Specifically, the Housing Code requires owners to
property does not lead to the conclusion that the respondent maintained ‘control’ over
the property.” Id. at 590, 810 A.2d at 947.
67. Id. at 591, 810 A.2d at 947.
68. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 353–56, 744 A.2d 47, 53–54 (2000), overruled by
Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003), as recognized in Allen v.
Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010); Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335
Md. 661, 670, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151 (1994), overruled by Brooks, 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616, as
recognized in Allen, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216.
69. Brown, 357 Md. at 358, 744 A.2d at 55.  If this is the case, then “what governs is the
legislature’s intention . . . not necessarily what a ‘reasonably prudent’ person would do
under such circumstances.”  Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 440, 374 A.2d 347, 353
(1977).
70. Brown, 357 Md. at 358–59, 744 A.2d at 55; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4, 335 Md.
at 671–72, 645 A.2d at 1152 (“[A] private cause of action in a landlord/tenant context can
arise from a violation of any statutory duty or implied warranty created by the Baltimore
City Code.”).
71. Brown, 357 Md. at 359, 744 A.2d at 55.
72. Id. at 359, 744 A.2d at 55; see also Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621 (quoting
Brown, 357 Md. at 359, 744 A.2d at 55).
73. Brown, 357 Md. at 359, 744 A.2d at 55 (“[T]he Baltimore City Housing Code . . .
prescribes duties with regard to the lease of housing for human habitation.”).
74. See id. at 360, 744 A.2d at 56 (explaining that “the housing code prohibits an owner
from ‘leas[ing] or permitt[ing] the subletting to another for occupancy any vacant or va-
cated dwelling or dwelling unit which does not comply with [its] provisions’” (alterations
in original) (quoting HOUSING CODE § 1001)).
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keep the leased premises in good repair and safe condition.75  “Good
repair and safe condition” is further defined as requiring that all
dwellings are kept free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint.76  The
court’s imposition of liability for violating the Housing Code has gone
through a transition over time: although the owner of property was
initially required to have knowledge of the alleged violation before
liability could be imposed,77 liability may now be imposed without the
owner’s knowledge of the violation.78
a. The Owner Was Originally Required to Have Notice of the
Defective Condition
The court originally held that the mere showing of flaking, loose,
or peeling paint was insufficient to hold an owner liable for negli-
gence under the Housing Code even though the loose paint was in
fact a violation.79  In Brown v. Dermer,80 the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff must show that the landlord had notice of the
defective condition.81  The court agreed with precedent and stated
that the Housing Code did not change Maryland’s common law re-
quirement of notice.82  The court then outlined a two-part test to
prove a prima facie case of negligence: (1) the plaintiff must show
75. HOUSING CODE § 702 (“Every building and all parts thereof used or occupied as a
dwelling shall, while in use . . . be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human
habitation.”); see also id. § 703 (explaining the standards for good repair and safe condi-
tion); Brown, 357 Md. at 359–61, 744 A.2d at 55–56 (describing the requirement that all
dwellings be fit for human habitation (citing HOUSING CODE §§ 701–08)); Richwind Joint
Venture 4, 335 Md. at 670–71, 645 A.2d at 1151–52 (citing HOUSING CODE §§ 702, 703, 706).
76. HOUSING CODE § 703(c)(3) (“All walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors, and windows
shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint and paper.”); see also
Brown, 357 Md. at 359–60, 744 A.2d at 55–56 (explaining the prohibition on flaking or
peeling paint in a dwelling’s interior); cf. Richwind Joint Venture 4, 335 Md. at 679–81, 645
A.2d at 1156–57 (upholding the jury’s verdict because there was sufficient evidence to
support the verdict where the landlord knew of the peeling paint and knew that paint in
old homes often contain lead).
77. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
78. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
79. See infra note 81. R
80. 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47.
81. Id. at 361–62, 744 A.2d at 57 (“[A]ll that a plaintiff must show in order to satisfy the
reason to know element is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint and that the defen-
dant had notice of that condition.  It need not be shown that the flaking, loose or peeling
paint was lead-based.”).
82. Id. at 362–63, 744 A.2d at 57–58; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335
Md. 661, 674, 645 A.2d 1147, 1153 (1994) (“Thus, the common law and the city code
appear consistent with each other as they apply to the prerequisite of knowledge and/or
notice.  Both require . . . notice of the dangerous condition on the property and a reasona-
ble opportunity to correct it.”), overruled by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 835
A.2d 616 (2003), as recognized in Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR407.txt unknown Seq: 11 10-JUN-11 10:44
2011] ALLEN V. DACKMAN 1181
that the defendant “knew or had reason to know of a condition on the
premises posing an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on
the premises”—here, sections 702 and 703 of the Housing Code pro-
hibit flaking, loose, or peeling paint;83 and (2) the plaintiff must show
that a defendant “of ordinary intelligence with the same knowledge”
would foresee the lead paint injury.84  In this case, the court held both
parts to be satisfied.  First, the plaintiff’s mother had complained to
the defendant about the deteriorating paint before the children were
born, giving them the required notice of the condition.85  Second, the
injury was foreseeable because the Housing Code was specifically de-
signed to put landlords on notice about the dangers of child lead
paint poisoning, the respondents were aware of city and state laws that
banned lead-based paint, and the respondents were aware of city ordi-
nances that required rental properties to be maintained in a habitable
condition.86
This two-step analysis required that the landlord have notice of
the defective condition and a reasonable opportunity to cure it.87
Neither step imposed upon the landlord a duty to periodically inspect
the premises.88  This rule reflected the court’s concern that to hold
otherwise would implement a policy in which landlords would “be-
come the ‘insurers’ of their tenants.”89
b. The Owner May Now Face Liability Without Knowledge of the
Violation
In 2003, the Court of Appeals overruled Brown and held that lia-
bility could be imposed under the Housing Code without the owner’s
knowledge of the defective condition.90  In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III,
Inc.,91 the court held that, under the Housing Code, a plaintiff alleg-
ing child lead paint poisoning does not have to prove that the owner
83. Brown, 357 Md. at 362, 744 A.2d at 57.  The court noted that “[t]he fact that a
defendant is a landlord or engages in a certain trade is not enough to meet the reason to
know standard.” Id.
84. Id. at 362, 744 A.2d at 57 (explaining that the question for the court is “whether the
lead-based paint injury is without, or within, the range of reasonable anticipation and
probability”).
85. Id. at 367, 744 A.2d at 60.
86. Id. at 367–68, 744 A.2d at 60.
87. Richwind Joint Venture 4, 335 Md. at 674, 645 A.2d at 1153.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 674–75, 645 A.2d at 1153.
90. See Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 72, 81, 835 A.2d 616, 617, 622
(2003) (“[T]he plaintiff does not have to show that the landlord had notice of the [Hous-
ing Code] violation to establish a prima facie case.”).
91. 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616.
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had notice of the violation to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence.92  The court reasoned that if a defendant’s duty is prescribed
by a statute, then the violation of that statute is sufficient to prove a
breach of duty in a negligence action.93
The court stated that a plaintiff must show the following to make
out a prima facie case of negligence: “(a) the violation of a statute or
ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which in-
cludes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the
injury complained of.”94  Proximate cause is established if the plaintiff
is protected by the statute and if the harm is of the kind intended to
be prevented by the statute.95  The court concluded that the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case of negligence.96  First, the plaintiff
was a child, and the Housing Code exists to protect children.97  Sec-
ond, the plaintiff suffered lead paint poisoning, and the Housing
Code serves to prevent that exact type of injury.98  The reasoning of
Brooks, which requires only the showing of a child who is suffering
from lead paint poisoning regardless of the owner’s knowledge of the
violation, has since been the rule for proving a prima facie case of
negligence under the Housing Code.99
B. The Maryland Limited Liability Company Act
The MLLCA was designed to provide a combination of favorable
tax treatment and limited liability in one business entity while also
providing flexibility in establishing the rights of its members.100  Lim-
ited liability companies are generally understood to provide members
92. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617 (“[In] a tort action against a Baltimore City landlord,
based upon . . . flaking, loose, or peeling paint in the leased premises, in violation of the
Housing Code, the plaintiff does not have to show that the landlord had notice of the
violation to establish a prima facie case.”).  This holding overruled Richwind Joint Venture 4 v.
Brunson and its progeny, including Brown v. Dermer. Id.  For more on Brooks, see Cori S.
Annapolen, Recent Decision, The Court of Appeals Paints a New Canvas: Imposing Stricter Stan-
dards on Landlords to Abate Lead Paint Poisoning in Children, 64 MD. L. REV. 1268 (2005).
93. Brooks, 378 Md. at 78–79, 835 A.2d at 620–21.
94. Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 473, 869 A.2d 837, 841 (2005) (“We reaf-
firm our holding in Brooks and hold that the standard for establishing a prima facie case
based on a violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code . . . as enunciated therein applies
to all cases not final at the time Brooks was filed.”); Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 192 Md. App.
366, 402–04, 994 A.2d 996, 1017–18 (2010) (quoting the rule stated in Brooks and clarifying
that the rule in Brooks establishes a prima facie case of negligence and not negligence per
se), cert. granted, 415 Md. 337, 1 A.3d 467 (2010).
100. See infra Part II.B.1.
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with the pass-through tax benefits of a partnership and the liability
shield of a corporation.101  The legislative history of the MLLCA sup-
ports this proposition and provides members with great freedom in
defining the management of the LLC.102
1. Limited Liability Companies Generally
The major interest in LLCs first began in September of 1988,
when the IRS stated that LLCs would be considered as partnerships
for purposes of the federal income tax if certain tests were met.103
The formation of an LLC offers a hybrid business structure between
partnerships and corporations.104  Acting like a partnership, an LLC
can be structured in a way that allows it to take advantage of federal
tax laws permitting pass-through taxation.105  Acting like a corpora-
tion, an LLC offers the owners of the business the same limited liabil-
ity protection enjoyed by the owners of a corporation.106  This hybrid
offers significant advantages over other forms of business structure by
providing greater certainty of the existence of both limited liability
and favorable tax treatment.107
The existence of limited liability is especially important to foster
business growth and economic development through encouraging
101. See infra Part II.B.1.
102. See infra Part II.B.2.
103. STUART LEVINE ET AL., MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, SECTIONS OF TAXATION & BUS. LAW,
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF H.B. 373 (THE MARYLAND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT) 1
(1992).  This position taken by the IRS then spurred a great deal of interest by state legisla-
tures in creating limited liability statutes. Id. at 1 & app. (listing states with limited liability
statutes and states that were introducing or expected to introduce legislation).  At that
time, eight states had already passed legislation implementing LLCs. Id.
104. See Letter in support of H.B. 373 from Md. Dep’t of Econ. & Emp’t Dev., to House
Judiciary (Feb. 5, 1992) (on file with the Maryland Law Review) (“The proposed Act repre-
sents a hybrid between partnerships and corporations that takes the best of both and none
of the disadvantages of either.”).
105. E.g., Floor Report, H.B. 373, 1992 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1992).
106. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 1.  The Maryland General Assembly sought to R
secure a liability shield in the MLLCA by including a provision which states, “no member
shall be personally liable for the obligations of the limited liability company, whether aris-
ing in contract, tort or otherwise, solely by reason of being a member of the limited liability
company.”  Maryland Limited Liability Act, ch. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286, 3297 (1992)
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORP. & ASS’NS § 4A-301 (LexisNexis 2007)).
107. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 1–2; see also Gebhardt Family Inv., L.L.C. v. Nations R
Title Ins. of New York, Inc., 132 Md. App. 457, 462–63, 752 A.2d 1222, 1225 (2000) (ex-
plaining that the creation of an LLC has the “unique ability to bring together in a single
business organization the best features of all other business forms—properly structured, its
owners obtain both a corporate-style liability shield and the pass-through tax benefits of a
partnership”).
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new investment.108  Limited liability “decreases the need to monitor
agents,” “reduces the costs of monitoring other shareholders,”
“promot[es] free transfer of shares,” “makes it possible for market
prices to reflect more information about the value of firms,” “allows
[for] more efficient diversification,” and “facilitates optimal invest-
ment decisions.”109  The primary benefit of limited liability is that it is
capable of changing behavior, thereby facilitating capital investment
and economic efficiency.110
2. Legislative History of the MLLCA
In the spring of 1990, the State of Maryland began to debate the
possibility of new legislation implementing the LLC business struc-
ture.111  The Maryland State Bar Association (“MSBA”) was one of the
first organizations to study and issue a report on the possibility of an
LLC statute within the Maryland Code.112
The MSBA report formed the basis of two bills that were intro-
duced in both houses of the Maryland General Assembly in the 1991
session.113  Over the summer of 1991, the concept of limited liability
proposed by these two bills was considered by the Senate Judicial Pro-
ceedings Committee and a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee.114  Subsequent to the comments of various legislators and
members of the bar, the MSBA issued a second proposed act on No-
vember 1, 1992.115  In 1992, the Maryland General Assembly officially
108. Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a
Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 51, 53–54 (2004) (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41–44 (1991)).
109. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 41–44. R
110. See Vandervoort, supra note 108, at 54–55 (“[T]he key economic justification for R
limited liability is based on the premise that apart from the simple shifting of loss from
interest holders to creditors, there is a change in behavior due to the limited liability status
of interest holders.” (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 45)). R
111. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 2. R
112. Id.  A joint committee was formed and led by the Taxation and Business Law sec-
tions of the MSBA. Id.  This committee issued its first report in September 1991. Id.  The
committee recommended the enactment of enabling legislation and set forth a proposed
Act. Id.; see also Floor Report, H.B. 373, 1992 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1992) (explain-
ing that the MLLCA bill was originally proposed by the MSBA sections of Taxation and
Business Law).
113. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 2.  One bill was introduced into the House while a R
similar bill was introduced in the Senate. Id.; David Conn, Limited-Liability Format for Compa-
nies Proposed, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27, 1991, at 9B (explaining H.B. 491 and S.B. 345, which were
introduced in 1991).
114. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 2; Blair S. Walker, Bill to Help New Firms Set to Be Re- R
introduced, BALT. SUN, July 23, 1991, at 10D (noting that the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee reviewed the bill during the summer of 1991).
115. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 2. R
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signed the Maryland Limited Liability Company Act (“MLLCA”) into
law.116
In addition to the liability shield and favorable tax treatment, the
MLLCA was specifically designed to provide a flexible business struc-
ture.117  As the MSBA described, one of the guiding principles in the
passage of the MLLCA was the premise that the LLC “should be as
flexible as possible and should allow its participants broad latitude to
manage their affairs.”118  The MLLCA embraced this flexible ap-
proach by allowing the parties great freedom in defining the manage-
ment and economic relationships of the LLC within the operating
agreement.119
The MLLCA was intended to provide businesses with flexibility
regarding tax and business planning.120  In so doing, the MLLCA was
intended to facilitate small business in Maryland and foster greater
business development.121  The MLLCA was seen as “the next logical
step in the development of sophisticated business entities.”122
C. Common Law Liability of Individuals Within a Business Entity
The liability protections afforded corporations and LLCs have
never been understood to be absolute.  Courts have consistently lim-
ited the liability shields of corporations and LLCs to hold individuals
personally liable in several appropriate circumstances: (1) individuals
of a corporation may be liable for the torts that they personally com-
mit or direct;123 (2) LLC members are only protected “solely by rea-
116. Maryland Limited Liability Act, ch. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286 (1992) (codified pri-
marily at § 4A of MD. CODE ANN., CORP. & ASS’NS (LexisNexis 2007)); Price v. Upper Ches-
apeake Health Ventures, 192 Md. App. 695, 704, 995 A.2d 1054, 1059 (2010), cert. denied,
415 Md. 609, 4 A.3d 514 (2010).
117. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 3. R
118. Id.
119. Id. (explaining that “many of the provisions of the Act with respect to the internal
management of a limited liability company and the economic relationship between the
limited liability company and its members can be altered by an ‘operating agreement’”).
For example, the Act specifically rejects a detailed definition of the term “manager.” Id. at
4.  Instead, the Act favors flexibility and the utilization of agency principles to determine
an individual’s degree of authority. Id.
120. Id. at 4 (“In short, the Act is intended to allow businesses to enjoy great flexibility,
both with respect to tax planning and business planning.”).
121. Lesa N. Hoover, On Behalf of the Members of the Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass’n,
Written Testimony Presented to the House Judiciary Committee (on file with the Maryland
Law Review); see also Letter in support of H.B. 373, supra note 104. R
122. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 103, at 4. R
123. See infra Part II.C.1.
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son” of being a member;124 (3) individuals may be liable by piercing
the corporate veil;125 and (4) individuals may be liable by piercing the
LLC veil.126
1. Individual Liability of Corporate Officers for Torts That They
Personally Commit or Direct
The liability shield of a corporation has never been understood to
provide full immunity from all liability.127  In Maryland, corporate of-
ficers and agents have been held liable in tort under two circum-
stances.  First, officers may be “personally liable for those torts which
they personally commit, or which they inspire or participate in, even
though performed in the name of an artificial body.”128  Second, of-
ficers may be liable when they are “present on a daily basis during
commission of the tort and give[ ] direct orders that cause commis-
sion of the tort.”129
a. Torts That the Corporate Officer Personally Commits
Corporate officers can be held individually liable for the torts
that they personally commit.130  This theory of liability requires active
participation in the tort by the officer.131  An officer cannot be held
124. See infra Part II.C.2.  Although the “solely by reason” language stems from the
MLLCA, its importance has been created mainly through the courts.
125. See infra Part II.C.3.
126. See infra Part II.C.4.
127. See infra Part II.C.  Understanding the case law regarding the liability of individuals
in a corporation is helpful in determining how a court may treat a similar set of facts
regarding an LLC.  The case law regarding LLCs tends to be underdeveloped because
LLCs are a relatively recent creation. See Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714,
720 (Colo. App. 2009) (“Because the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
most fully developed in cases concerning corporate shareholders, we begin by examining
those cases.”); cf. Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS,
2009 WL 1124451, at *9 n.43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (“[I]n the absence of developed
LLC case law, this court has often decided LLC cases by looking to analogous provisions in
limited partnership law.”).  Corporations represent a helpful comparison because LLCs
were designed with the specific intention of creating the same liability shield that currently
existed in corporations. See supra notes 106, 117 and accompanying text; see also R
Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (explaining that LLCs were
created to operate with limited liability like corporations and commenting that “for liability
purposes, a limited liability company should be subject to the same treatment as a
corporation”).
128. Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972).
129. T-Up, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 145 Md. App. 27, 72, 801 A.2d 173, 199 (2002).
130. Tedrow, 265 Md. at 550, 290 A.2d at 802.
131. See id. at 550–51, 290 A.2d at 802 (“If the officer takes no part in the commission of
the tort committed by the corporation, he is not personally liable therefore unless he spe-
cifically directed the particular act to be done, or participated or cooperated therein.”); T-
Up, Inc., 145 Md. App. at 72–73, 801 A.2d at 173 (“If an officer ‘either specifically directed,
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liable for the torts of the corporation if the individual had no knowl-
edge of the tort.132  “[P]articipation in the tort is essential to
liability.”133
For example, in Brock Bridge Ltd. Partnership v. Development
Facilitators, Inc.,134 the Court of Special Appeals held that the presi-
dent of a general contractor could be held personally liable for negli-
gently estimating the cost of the project.135  The court reasoned that
“[f]ar from being merely an instrument” of the corporation, the presi-
dent “exercised his own professional judgment and skill in making the
cost estimates.”136  The court held that the president could be person-
ally liable for the tort of the corporation because the president per-
sonally created the negligent cost estimates.137
b. Officer Is Present and Directs the Commission of the Tort
Corporate officers can also be held liable if the individual is pre-
sent on a daily basis and orders another person to commit the tortious
action.138  Physical participation in the tort itself is not required to
assign liability under this reasoning.139  The officer must still have
knowledge of the tort, however, as he is required to be present and
direct the commission of the tort.140
For instance, in MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc.,141 the
Court of Special Appeals held that the president of a corporation
could be held personally liable for directing the transmission of an
or actively participated or cooperated in’ the corporation’s tort, personal liability may be
imposed.” (emphasis omitted by court) (quoting St. James Constr. Co. v. Morlock, 89 Md.
App. 217, 223, 597 A.2d 1042, 1045 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. Tedrow, 265 Md. at 551, 290 A.2d at 802 (explaining that “an officer or director is
not liable for torts of which he has no knowledge, or to which he has not consented”).
133. Id. at 550, 290 A.2d at 802.  The court also noted that “there must have been upon
his part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or help to bring about, the injury; he must
have been a participant in the wrongful act.” Id. at 551, 290 A.2d at 803.
134. 114 Md. App. 144, 689 A.2d 622 (1997).
135. Id. at 166–67, 689 A.2d at 633–34.
136. Id. at 167, 689 A.2d at 634.
137. Id.
138. T-Up, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 145 Md. App. 27, 72, 801 A.2d 173, 199 (2002).
139. See id. (“Officers of a corporation may be individually liable for wrongdoing that is
based on their decisions.”).
140. See MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 166 Md. App. 481, 528, 890 A.2d
818, 845–46 (2006) (“Thus, officers and agents of a corporation or limited liability com-
pany may be held personally liable for CPA violations when they direct . . . the prohibited
conduct.”); T-Up, Inc., 145 Md. App. at 72, 801 A.2d at 199 (“And, where a corporate of-
ficer is present on a daily basis during the commission of the tort and gives direct orders
that cause commission of the tort, the officer may be personally liable.”).
141. 166 Md. App. 481, 890 A.2d 818.
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unsolicited mass e-mail that was received by the plaintiff.142  The court
reasoned that corporate officers cannot escape liability by not being
“hands on” at every step of the action.143  It was also not necessary for
the president to have personally selected any specific e-mail ad-
dress.144  It was sufficient that the president personally hired a com-
pany to send mass advertising e-mails on his company’s behalf.145
2. Personal Liability of a Member of an LLC to a Third Party
When the MLLCA was originally passed, the General Assembly
included within the Act a provision to protect individual members of
an LLC from personal liability.146  The MLLCA stated in full: “Except
as otherwise provided by this title, no member shall be personally lia-
ble for the obligations of the limited liability company, whether aris-
ing in contract, tort or otherwise, solely by reason of being a member
of the limited liability company.”147  When interpreting the liability
shield of an LLC, other state courts have focused on the specific
phrase “solely by reason.”148
a. The “Solely by Reason” Language of the MLLCA
The phrase “solely by reason” provides that individual LLC mem-
bers are protected from liability only because of their status as mem-
142. See id. at 530, 890 A.2d at 847 (“[W]e hold that [an Internet service provider’s]
allegations that [an out-of-state Internet marketing company’s president] transmitted or
assisted in the transmission of mass email advertisements to Maryland that violated [the
Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act] were sufficient to surpass a motion for sum-
mary judgment . . . .”).
143. Id.
144. Id. (“If [president] directed [out-of-state Internet marketing company] to send
hundreds of thousands of email advertisements to persons all over the country, it is not
necessary for him to have selected any particular recipient for him to be personally liable
for tort violations of this consumer protection statute.”).
145. Id., 890 A.2d at 846–47.  (Just as [an out-of-state Internet marketing company]
knew it was sending emails into Maryland, so did [its president], if he directed that mass
mailing.”).  In its opinion, the court emphasized that the president at no time denied his
participation in the mass e-mails. Id. at 529–30, 890 A.2d at 846–47 (explaining that the
president did not deny making the decision to send the mass e-mails, did not deny retain-
ing the services of Master Mailings to transmit the mass e-mails, and did not allege that the
company consisted of any other employees besides himself).  Maryland courts, however,
have not yet had the opportunity to determine if the manager or member of an LLC can
equally be held liable for participating in tortious conduct or for being present on a daily
basis and directing tortious conduct.
146. Maryland Limited Liability Act, ch. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286, 3297 (1992) (codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CORP. & ASS’NS § 4A-301 (LexisNexis 2007)).
147. Id.
148. See infra Part II.C.2.a.
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bers of the LLC.149  No Maryland court has interpreted or provided
any context to help define exactly what “solely by reason” means.150
Looking to other jurisdictions, there is currently a split among the
states as to what the “solely by reason” phrase actually protects against:
some states allow LLC members to be held liable when acting in the
service of the LLC;151 other states do not allow members to be held
liable when acting in the service of the LLC.152
i. In Some States, a Member Is Liable When Acting in Service of
the LLC
Some states have interpreted the phrase “solely by reason” to pro-
tect members from personal liability only with regard to their status as
an LLC member.153  In other words, the member becomes more than
simply a member upon taking some action.154  This allows individual
members to be held personally liable for all tortious activity in which
they participate.155  Liability is imposed on individual members re-
149. See infra Part II.C.2.a.i–ii.
150. Cf. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 154, 991 A.2d 1216, 1229 (2010) (adopting an
interpretation of “solely” from the Supreme Court of Connecticut (citing Weber v. U.S.
Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 824–25 (Conn. 2007))).
151. See infra Part II.C.2.a.i.
152. See infra Part II.C.2.a.ii.  Not every state has addressed this issue, so there does not
yet appear to be a clear majority view.
153. E.g., Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. M.S.I. Holdings, LLC, No. C.A. 08-
217ML, 2008 WL 4681775, at *3 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2008) (construing the Rhode Island Lim-
ited Liability Company Act and explaining that the “status as a member does not of itself
create liability for the LLC’s obligations”); Brophy v. Ament, No. CIV 07-0751 JB/KBM,
2008 WL 4821610, at *6 (D.N.M. July 9, 2008) (construing New Mexico’s Limited Liability
Company Act and stating that “[t]he limited liability company shield relates only to liability
arising from a member’s status as member”); People v. Pacific Landmark, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d
193, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “managers of limited liability companies may
not be held liable for the wrongful conduct of the companies merely because of the manag-
ers’ status”); Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Coop. Ass’n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa
2004) (“The phrase ‘solely by reason of’ refers to liability based upon membership or man-
agement status.”).
154. Weber, 924 A.2d at 824 (noting that to be held personally liable for an LLC’s obliga-
tion, the LLC member “must do more than merely be a member”).
155. See Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4681775, at *3 (explaining that the
“status as a member . . . does not absolve a member from his or her own tort liability”
(citations omitted)); Brophy, 2008 WL 4821610, at *7 (“Specific direction or sanction of, or
active participation or cooperation in, a positively wrongful act of commission or omis-
sion . . . is necessary to generate individual liability in damages of an officer or agent . . . .”
(quoting Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958))); Pacific
Landmark, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 199 (stating that “[managers] may nonetheless be held ac-
countable . . . for their personal participation in tortious or criminal conduct”); Estate of
Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at 604 (finding that tort liability would not be imposed “on a
manager for merely performing a general administrative duty” because “[t]here must be
some participation”).
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gardless of whether the alleged wrongful conduct occurred when the
individual was acting as the manager or member of the LLC.156
Under this reasoning, the phrase “solely by reason” is limited to pro-
tecting the individual’s status as a member, and no protection is af-
forded to actions taken by the member regardless of whether that
action was in service of the LLC.157
For example, in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salisbury, Maryland v.
Handy,158 the Court of Chancery of Delaware denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss because the individual defendants, who were LLC
members, could be held personally liable for the alleged tortious con-
duct.159  The court reasoned that the phrase “solely by reason” neces-
sarily implies that there are some situations in which LLC members
may be held personally liable.160  The court found that the alleged
wrongful conduct occurred before the LLC was ever formed.161  The
members therefore could not have been acting solely by reason of
being members of an LLC because no LLC existed at the time of the
actions.162
In Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.,163 the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, applying Delaware law, expanded upon the reasoning of
the chancery court and held that Delaware law did not bar an individ-
156. See Brophy, 2008 WL 4821610, at *6 (stating that “‘the fact that a member’s conduct
is in connection with, or even in the service of, an originally limited liability company will
not negate liability’”); Pacific Landmark, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 201 (stating that “[solely by
reason] does not preclude holding managers liable for their participation in wrongful con-
duct when acting on behalf of the company”); Estate of Countryman, 679 N.W.2d at 604
(finding that “[solely by reason] does not distinguish between conduct of a member or
manager that may be separate and independent from the member or management role”).
157. A hypothetical may help clarify what these states interpret the phrase “solely by
reason” as protecting: Suppose member A commits a tort in the name of the LLC against a
third party, but member B neither knew nor participated in the tortious conduct.  The
reasoning of these states permits member A to be personally liable even if he was acting in
service of the LLC.  Member B, however, cannot be held personally liable “solely by rea-
son” of being a member because member B did nothing more than simply be a member of
the LLC.
158. No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000).
159. Id. at *3–4 (explaining that “a person [who] makes material misrepresentations to
induce a purchaser to purchase a parcel of land at a price far above fair market value, and
thereafter forms an LLC to purchase and hold the land” may be held liable and cannot
“later claim that his status as an LLC member protects him from liability to the
purchaser”).
160. Id. at *3 (“[The] phrase, ‘solely by reason of being a member’ . . . does imply that
there are situations where LLC members and managers would not be shielded by this
provision.” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (West 2011))).
161. Id. at *4.
162. Id.
163. 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007).
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ual LLC member’s personal liability for tortious conduct.164  The
court stated that an individual member may be personally liable if it is
shown that the member took some action and was therefore more
than simply a member of the LLC.165  That is, the limited liability
shield does not protect members from their own tortious conduct.166
The court specifically concluded that the trial court had improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, two LLC mem-
bers, because they could be liable for allegedly sending unsolicited
faxes to the plaintiff on behalf of the LLC.167
Courts in California,168 Idaho,169 Iowa,170 New Mexico,171 and
Rhode Island172 have applied similar reasoning to impose personal
liability on a member for his tortious activity regardless of whether he
was acting in the service of the LLC.  This group of states has limited
164. Id. at 823–25.
165. See id. at 824–25.
166. Id. at 825.
167. Id. at 820 n.1, 822.
168. E.g., People v. Pacific Landmark, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(stating that “[‘solely by reason’] does not preclude holding managers liable for their par-
ticipation in wrongful conduct when acting on behalf of the company”).  The court af-
firmed the order issuing the preliminary injunction, holding that it was properly issued
against the manager of an LLC who allowed prostitution to occur on the LLC’s property
because of the manager’s personal involvement in allowing the nuisance to persist and not
“solely because of his status as manager of [the LLC].” Id. at 202.
169. E.g., Restoration Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Certified Restorers Consulting Grp., LLC, No.
CV-07-227-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2898698, at *2 n.1 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2007) (explaining that
the LLC statute does not grant immunity to members and only affords protection solely by
reason of being a member (citing J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 167 P.3d 748, 750 (Idaho
2006))).
170. Cf., e.g., Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Coop. Ass’n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa
2004) (explaining that “[‘solely by reason’] does not distinguish between conduct of a
member or manager that may be separate and independent from the member or manage-
ment role”).  The court found that a cooperative, acting “as the designated manager of an
LLC,” could be liable for participating in tortious conduct “through the conduct of those
individuals acting on behalf of [the cooperative]” in performing its duties as manager, and
the court concluded that the district court improperly granted summary judgment based
on the limited liability provisions. Id. at 605.
171. E.g., Brophy v. Ament, No. CIV 07-0751 JB/KBM, 2008 WL 4821610, at *6 (D.N.M.
July 9, 2008) (stating that a manager’s conduct in connection with or in the service of the
limited liability company “‘will not negate liability’”).  The court concluded that regardless
of whether they were within the scope of their position within an LLC, two members of an
auto repair shop could be held liable for their possibly tortious actions in attempting to
collect money and denied their motion to dismiss. Id. at *10–11.
172. E.g., Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. M.S.I. Holdings, LLC, No. C.A. 08-
217ML, 2008 WL 4681775, at *3 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2008) (“While status as a member does
not of itself create liability . . . it does not absolve a member from his or her own tort
liability.” (citations omitted)).  The court denied the LLC member’s motion to dismiss
after finding that an LLC member could be liable for fraudulent representations that the
individual defendant made while working for the LLC. Id. at *1–3.
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the liability shield of an LLC by narrowly interpreting the phrase
“solely by reason” to protect against liability only with regard to the
member’s status as a member.
ii. In Some States, a Member Is Not Liable When Acting in
Service of the LLC
Some courts have interpreted the phrase “solely by reason” to
shield individual members from personal liability for actions taken in
the management of the LLC.173  Under this rule, individual members
may be liable for their tortious conduct if such conduct occurred
outside of the individual’s member status.174  Under this reasoning,
the language “solely by reason” protects members from personal lia-
bility for affirmative actions taken in the service of the LLC.175
For instance, in Crump v. Mack,176 a district court in Virginia, con-
sidering Virginia law, found that members of an LLC could not be
held personally liable solely by reason of executing a contract on be-
half of the LLC.177  In considering whether to grant the defendants’
173. E.g., Crump v. Mack, No. 6:08CV00017, 2008 WL 4693511, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 23,
2008) (“[Plaintiff] has not alleged any facts supporting a personal agreement with any of
the individual Defendants outside of their roles as agents of the company.”); HWB, Inc. v.
MetalPro Indus., L.L.C., No. 05-6665, 2006 WL 1581329, at *2 (E.D. La. June 7, 2006)
(finding that a “wrongful act” must refer “‘to acts done outside one’s capacity as a mem-
ber, manager, employee, or agent of the limited liability company’” (quoting Curole v.
Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 92, 97 (La. Ct. App. 2002))); Resheff, Inc. v. 970 Kent
Ave. Assocs., LLC, No. 40337/07, 2009 WL 175039, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009)
(explaining that “it is well settled that a member of a limited liability company is statutorily
exempt from individual liability for acts taken on behalf of the company”); Brew City Rede-
velopment Grp., LLC v. Ferchill Grp., 714 N.W.2d 582, 590–91 (Wis. Ct. App.) (explaining
that “neither members of a limited liability company nor its manager may be liable in tort,
for their acts or conduct as a member or manager, to third persons”), aff’d, 724 N.W.2d
879 (Wis. 2006).
174. See Crump, 2008 WL 4693511, at *2 (“[A] member of a[n] LLC may be individually
liable where the plaintiff pleads facts demonstrating that particular member’s culpability in
the company’s tortious conduct that extends beyond that his or her mere status as a mem-
ber of the company.”); HWB, Inc., 2006 WL 1581329, at *2 (“Accordingly, a member of an
LLC may be liable for his individual negligent or wrongful conduct only if such conduct is
done outside of his capacity as a member of the LLC.”).
175. Returning to the hypothetical at note 157: Suppose that the tortious conduct com- R
mitted by member A was a misrepresentation about the quality of the LLC’s product.  If
the misrepresentation was a good faith statement of the LLC describing the normal quality
of the product, then member A would not be personally liable because he acted in service
of the LLC.  If, however, member A misrepresented the quality of the product for the
purpose of gaining personal profit at the expense of the LLC, then member A could be
held personally liable because he did not act in service of the LLC.
176. No. 6:08CV00017, 2008 WL 4693511.
177. Id. at *2 (explaining that the plaintiff had “not alleged any facts supporting a per-
sonal agreement with any of the individual Defendants outside of their roles as agents of
the company”).
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motion to dismiss, the court reasoned that the plaintiff must plead
facts demonstrating a member’s tortious conduct beyond the defen-
dant’s mere status as an LLC member in order to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.178  In this case, the plaintiff entered into
a contract with an LLC.179  The plaintiff intended to be compensated
by the LLC, not by the LLC’s individual members, and the plaintiff
failed to allege any express or implied promise that was not for the
benefit of the LLC.180  Thus, the court found that the plaintiff had
failed to allege any actions taken by the individual members beyond
their status as members of the LLC and accordingly granted the mo-
tion to dismiss against individual LLC members.181
A New York court applying similar principles reached the oppo-
site conclusion in Resheff, Inc. v. 970 Kent Avenue Associates, LLC.182
Considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that
the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the defendant LLC members
“may have been acting with motives other than to benefit [the LLC]”
and thus held that they could be held liable for the tortious interfer-
ence of a business contract.183  The court reasoned that a member of
an LLC is protected from personal liability for acts taken in service of
the LLC.184  This rule only applies, however, if the member acts in
good faith.185  The court found that the plaintiff’s complaint, which
alleged that the members intentionally induced the breach of a con-
tract for their own profit, sufficiently alleged that the LLC members
may have been acting with motives to benefit themselves as opposed
to the LLC.186  The court, however, granted the motion to dismiss be-
cause the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.187
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. No. 40337/07, 2009 WL 175039 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
183. Id. at *7.
184. Id.
185. Id.  A member is not acting in good faith and thus subject to liability “where [he]
acted in his or her personal interest, rather than the interests of the company, or where it
is alleged that the acts ‘were calculated to impair the plaintiff’s business for the personal
profit of the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Joan Hansen & Co., Inc. v. Everlast World’s Boxing
Headquarters Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 384, 391 (App. Div. 2002)).
186. Id.  The plaintiff in this case alleged that the LLC members intentionally gave the
plaintiff wrong information so as to deliberately slow down a construction project and in-
duce the LLC to thus fire the plaintiff. Id. at *2.  Once the plaintiff was fired, the LLC then
hired a new general contractor, whom it was alleged was owned by the LLC members. Id.
187. Id. at *8.
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Courts in Louisiana,188 North Carolina,189 and Wisconsin190 have
applied similar reasoning to conclude that members of an LLC are
not personally liable when acting in the service of the LLC.191  This
188. See, e.g., HWB, Inc. v. MetalPro Indus., L.L.C., No. 05-6665, 2006 WL 1581329, at *2
(E.D. La. June 7, 2006) (relying on precedent that held that a “‘wrongful act’” must refer
“‘to acts done outside one’s capacity as a member, manager, employee, or agent of the
limited liability company’” (quoting Curole v. Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 92, 97
(La. Ct. App. 2002))).  The court concluded that dismissal of plaintiff’s claims was proper
because “[i]n order to establish liability in an individual capacity, the individual’s negligent
or wrongful conduct must be performed outside of that individual’s capacity as a member
of the LLC” and here plaintiff had alleged no facts that plaintiff had acted outside of the
member’s status as a member. Id. at *1, *3.
189. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 646 S.E.2d 645, 649 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (explaining that the North Carolina LLC statute specifically states that “‘a member[
or] manager . . . is not liable for the obligations of a limited liability company solely by reason of
being a member[ or] manager . . . and does not become so by participating, in whatever capacity,
in the management or control of the business’” (emphasis added by court) (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 57C-3-30(a) (2005))).
190. See, e.g., Brew City Redevelopment Grp., LLC v. Ferchill Grp., 714 N.W.2d 582,
590–91 (Wis. Ct. App.) (explaining that “neither members of a limited liability company
nor its manager may be liable in tort, for their acts or conduct as a member or manager, to
third persons”), aff’d, 724 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 2006).  The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the intentional interference with the contractual relationship claim
against the manager of an LLC after finding that the manager could not be liable for
interference with a real estate purchase because the plaintiff failed to allege actions beyond
those taken as the manager. Id.
191. Because Maryland has not defined the context in which a member’s actions are
“solely by reason” of being a member, it is helpful to discuss other principles of Maryland
corporate law that may help shed light on this issue; specifically, agency law and corporate
successor law are useful points of discussion.
First, agency law states that the actions of corporate officers are binding on the princi-
pal when such actions “are performed within the scope of [the agents’] authority, either
express or implied.”  Johnson v. Maryland Trust Co., 176 Md. 557, 565, 6 A.2d 383, 386
(1939).  Actions taken outside of the agent’s authority and “knowledge of an agent whose
interests are adverse to the principal cannot be imputed to the principal.”  Hecht v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 345, 635 A.2d 394, 405 (1994); P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc. v.
Childs, 251 Md. 646, 654, 248 A.2d 473, 477 (1968) (“We have held that a statement made
by an agent will not bind his principal until an agency is established and then only if the
statement is within the scope of the agency . . . .” (citing Deane v. Big Spring Distilling Co.,
138 Md. 388, 392–93, 113 A. 891, 893 (1921))); see also Felland Ltd. P’ship v. Digi-tel
Commc’ns, LLC, 384 Md. 520, 531, 864 A.2d 1027, 1034 (2004) (exploring cases that “de-
lineated the general rules for determining whether an employee’s wrongful acts are within
the scope of employment, thereby rendering the employer liable for such acts”); Lohmul-
ler Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, 160 Md. 534, 540–41, 154 A. 41, 44 (1931) (“[K]nowledge pri-
vately acquired by any such agent, and not communicated to his principal or associates, will
not be imputed to the corporation in matters in which the interest of the agent is adverse
to its own, even where the agent actively participates in the transaction.”).  In Bob Holding
Corp. v. Normal Realty Corp., the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that the act of the attor-
ney who gave notice to the third party under the direction of the corporate client must be
presumed to be the corporate client’s act.  233 Md. 260, 266–67, 164 A.2d 457, 460–61
(1960).  In contrast, in Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., the Maryland Court of Appeals stated
that “consistent with Maryland agency law,” in an adverse domination situation, directors
of a corporation could not reasonably be expected to communicate knowledge of their
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group of states has interpreted the phrase “solely by reason” more
broadly by protecting members from personal liability for affirmative
actions taken in service of the LLC.
3. Piercing the Corporate Veil
Maryland courts will generally respect the liability shield of a cor-
poration and refuse to hold individual officers liable for an obligation
of the corporation.192  In the appropriate circumstances, however, Ma-
ryland courts will disregard the corporate form and hold individual
officers liable through the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.193
As stated in Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc.,194 although a
court may “disregard the corporate entity and deal with substance
rather than form, as though a corporation did not exist, shareholders
generally are not held individually liable for debts or obligations of a
corporation except where it is necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a
paramount equity.”195  The fact that a particular defendant “con-
trolled and operated” the corporation does not by itself justify the
piercing of the corporate veil to impose individual liability.196  Mary-
land is more restrictive than most jurisdictions in allowing the corpo-
own wrongdoing to the business.  333 Md. at 345–46, 635 A.2d at 405 (considering certi-
fied questions from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland).  For a
further discussion of how agency law supports adopting a rule that protects members from
personal liability when acting in the good faith service of the LLC, see infra Part IV.B.2.b.
Second, corporate successor law holds generally that a successor corporation is not
liable for the obligations of the previous corporation subject to four specific exceptions.
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 617, 594 A.2d 564, 565–66 (1991).  A successor corpo-
ration will only be held liable for the obligations of its predecessor if (1) “‘there is an
express or implied agreement’”; (2) there is a consolidation or merger; (3) the successor
“‘is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor’”; or (4) there is fraud, a lack
of good faith, or insufficient consideration. Id.; Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80
Md. App. 282, 290, 562 A.2d 1286, 1289–90 (1989).  For a more detailed discussion of how
corporate successor law supports the adoption of a rule that protects members from per-
sonal liability when acting in the good faith service of the LLC, see infra Part IV.B.2.c.
192. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 310, 340 A.2d 225, 234
(1975); Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123, 159,
603 A.2d 1301, 1319 (1991) (explaining that there was no evidence of a failure to observe
corporate formalities where officers and directors were involved with corporate activities
and concluding that disregarding the corporate form could not be justified).
193. Bart Arconti, 275 Md. at 310, 340 A.2d at 234.
194. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225.
195. Id. at 310, 340 A.2d at 234 (citation omitted); see also Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip.
Co., 378 Md. 724, 732–33, 838 A.2d 1204, 1209 (2003) (quoting the definition from Bart
Arconti); Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md.
App. 294, 306, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999) (same); Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421,
427–28, 401 A.2d 480, 484 (1979) (same).
196. Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633–34, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970).
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rate veil to be pierced.197  In Maryland, the corporate veil may be
pierced in two circumstances: (1) fraud or (2) enforcement of a para-
mount equity.198
a. Piercing the Corporate Veil Based on Fraud
To prove fraud so as to pierce the corporate veil, the plaintiff
must prove five elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a ma-
terial representation was false; (2) the defendant knew the statement
was false or made the statement with reckless indifference to the
truth; (3) the misrepresentation was meant to defraud; (4) the plain-
tiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered damage from the misrepresentation.199  The burden of proof
is on the party alleging fraud to state clear and specific facts establish-
ing the fraud.200
For example, in Colandrea v. Colandrea,201 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that the plaintiff had proven fraud so as to
allow for the piercing of the corporate veil.202  Upon settling their di-
vorce, the ex-wife, the defendant, executed a stock redemption to buy
out her ex-husband, the plaintiff.203  The ex-wife then created a new
company to which she transferred the assets of the previous com-
pany.204  In reviewing the trial court’s refusal to pierce the corporate
veil, the Court of Special Appeals explained that the defendant’s rea-
sons for creating a new corporation were completely “devoid of
merit.”205  The court concluded that “the trial court clearly erred in
failing to consider [the defendant’s] admission in a deposition” that
the defendant “entered into the stock redemption agreement with the
deliberate intention and purpose of cheating and defrauding” the
plaintiff.206  The court stated that in cases of such fraud, the corpora-
tion and the individual responsible for such conduct are liable for
damages.207  The court was willing to pierce the corporate veil be-
197. Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 309–10, 728 A.2d at 790–91.
198. Id. at 306–07, 728 A.2d at 789.
199. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484.
200. Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 367, 76 A.2d 566, 570 (1950).
201. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480.
202. Id. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484.
203. Id. at 422–23, 401 A.2d at 481–82.
204. Id. at 423–24, 401 A.2d at 482.
205. Id. at 429, 401 A.2d at 485.
206. Id. at 430–32, 401 A.2d at 485–86.
207. Id. at 432, 401 A.2d at 486 (“Agents of a corporation . . . cannot hide behind the
corporate shield and say they were acting solely as the agents of the corporation.” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 367, 76 A.2d 566, 570
(1950))).
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cause the evidence which the plaintiff ex-husband had presented met
the elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence—the ex-wife
had abused the corporate form by using the liability shield for the sole
purpose of committing fraud.208
b. Piercing the Corporate Veil to Enforce a Paramount Equity
The general rule regarding enforcement of a paramount equity is
that a court may pierce the corporate veil when a single individual
owns substantially all the stock of a corporation in combination with
other factors clearly showing a disregard for the corporate form.209
Some of the other factors that a court may consider in deciding to
pierce the corporate veil based on equity include (1) whether the cor-
poration was undercapitalized, failed to recognize the corporate form
or to issue stock or pay dividends, or failed to operate the business
with a profit; (2) whether there was a commingling of corporate and
personal assets; (3) whether there were nonfunctioning corporate of-
ficers; (4) whether the corporation was insolvent when the transaction
took place; and (5) whether corporate records were maintained.210
Although Maryland case law allows for the corporate veil to be pierced
when a paramount equity is present, arguments “for reasons other
than fraud” have virtually always failed in Maryland courts.211
For instance, in Hildreth v. Tidewater Equipment Co.,212 the Court of
Appeals held that a corporation’s failure to satisfy its obligations
under a contract did not trigger the paramount equity necessary to
justify piercing the corporate veil.213  The court stated that the con-
208. Id. at 432, 401 A.2d at 486–87.
209. See Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126
Md. App. 294, 307, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999).  The court in Residential Warranty Corp.
stated,
[W]hen substantial ownership of all the stock of a corporation in a single individ-
ual is combined with other factors clearly supporting disregard of the corporate
fiction on grounds of fundamental equity and fairness, courts have experienced
“little difficulty” and have shown no hesitancy in applying what is described as the
“alter ego” or “instrumentality” theory in order to cast aside the corporate shield
and to fasten liability on the individual stockholder.
Id. (quoting Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123,
158–59, 603 A.2d 1301, 1318 (1992)).
210. Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 378 Md. 724, 735–36, 838 A.2d 1204, 1210–11
(2003); see also Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 307, 728 A.2d at 789 (articulating
a similar, but slightly different, list of factors).
211. Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 307, 728 A.2d at 789 (quoting Travel
Comm., Inc., 91 Md. App. at 156, 603 A.2d at 1317) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. 378 Md. 724, 838 A.2d 1204.
213. Id. at 734–39, 838 A.2d at 1210–13.
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duct in Bart Arconti,214 which was clearly undertaken by a corporate
officer for the purpose of causing the corporation to “evade a legal
obligation,” did not justify piercing the corporate veil.215  With Bart
Arconti as precedent, the conduct in the instant case of a corporate
officer failing to register a foreign corporation to do business within
the State of Maryland did not rise to the required level of paramount
equity.216  Thus, although Maryland law allows for piercing of the cor-
porate veil to enforce a paramount equity, Maryland courts have not
found sufficient facts to justify piercing the corporate veil for this
reason.217
4. Piercing the LLC Veil
Maryland courts have not yet addressed whether the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil applies with equal force to LLCs.218  Other
jurisdictions, however, have addressed this issue and concluded that
the doctrine does in fact apply similarly to LLCs.  For example, in
Westmeyer v. Flynn,219 an Illinois appellate court, applying Delaware
law, held that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies in
similar circumstances to LLCs.220  The court stated that LLCs were
214. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. was a subcontractor that defaulted on contracts for three
construction projects.  Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 303–05,
340 A.2d 225, 230–31 (1975).  The company’s directors then allowed the company to be-
come “dormant” while allowing two other corporations to use Arconti’s equipment without
compensation, make loans in Arconti’s name, and transfer Arconti’s insurance policy. Id.
at 304–05, 340 A.2d at 231.  The trial court found that the only purpose for these actions
was to “‘evade legal obligations’” owed by Arconti. Id. at 305, 340 A.2d at 231.  Still, the
appellate court stated that it was not “aware of any Maryland case law” that supported
piercing the corporate veil “merely because [the court] wished to prevent an ‘evasion of
legal obligations’—absent evidence of fraud or similar conduct.” Id. at 311–12, 340 A.2d at
235.
215. Hildreth, 378 Md. at 738–39, 838 A.2d at 1212.
216. Id. at 728, 739, 838 A.2d at 1206, 1212–13.  The court explained that the Court of
Special Appeals had erred in justifying the imposition of liability on the sole shareholder
for “disregarding the corporate existence ‘in order to prevent the evasion of legal obliga-
tions,’” and held that this was not “a separate basis for piercing a corporate veil.” Id. at
737–39, 838 A.2d at 1211–12.  The court rejected piercing the corporate veil on two bases.
First, “nothing in [the] record,” the court stated, justified piercing the corporate veil for
the sole shareholder’s use of the corporation as “‘a mere shield for the perpetration of
fraud.’” Id. at 734, 838 A.2d at 1210.  Second, nothing in the record supported piercing
the corporate veil for failure to observe the corporate entity, or under the “alter ego”
doctrine. Id. at 735–37, 838 A.2d at 1210–11.
217. See Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 429, 809 A.2d 18, 64 (2002); Residential
Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md. App. 294, 307, 728
A.2d 783, 789 (1999).
218. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 153–54, 991 A.2d 1216, 1228–29 (2010).
219. 889 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
220. Id. at 678 (“[U]nder Delaware law, just as with a corporation, the corporate veil of
an LLC may be pierced, where appropriate.  Therefore, the granting of the defendants’
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created to provide the same tax treatment as partnerships, and the
same liability shield as corporations.221  Thus, the court reasoned, the
liability shield of an LLC should be treated the same as the liability
shield of a corporation.222  That is, while the members of an LLC are
not generally liable for the obligations of the LLC, the veil of the LLC
may be pierced in the appropriate circumstances.223
Courts in Arizona,224 Colorado,225 Connecticut,226 Georgia,227 In-
diana,228 Louisiana,229 New York,230 and Wyoming231 have used simi-
lar reasoning in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to
LLCs.
motion to  dismiss on the ground that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil did not
apply to the defendants’ LLC was error.”).
221. Id. at 677.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 677–78.
224. Cf., e.g., Gray v. Shaw, No. 1 CA-CV 06-0298, 2007 WL 5439746, at *11 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Aug. 9, 2007) (“Assuming without deciding that ‘piercing the corporate veil’ applies
to LLCs,” but finding that appellants “ha[d] not presented evidence of a question of fact as
to whether the doctrine should apply in this case”).
225. See, e.g., Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485, 490
(Colo. App. 2001) (applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to an LLC based
on the patterns of ownership and the determination that the entities were
interchangeable).
226. See, e.g., Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 310, 316 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002) (concluding that the trial court properly disregarded the LCCs’ liability
shields after finding “sufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veils”); see also, e.g., KLM
Indus., Inc. v. Tylutki, 815 A.2d 688, 689–90 n.2 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“[W]e agree with
the [trial] court that the determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil of a stock
corporation or to disregard the protections afforded a limited liability company requires
the same analysis.”); Pompilli v. Pro-Line Painting, No. CV044001774, 2005 WL 1433185, at
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 13, 2005) (citing Litchfield, 799 A.2d at 310) (“The doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil, as applied to corporations, also applies to a limited liability
company.”).
227. See, e.g., Bonner v. Brunson, 585 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“A court may
disregard the separate LLC entity and the protective veil it provides to an individual mem-
ber of the LLC when that member . . . conducts his personal and LLC business as if they
were one by commingling the two on an interchangeable or joint basis . . . .”).
228. See, e.g., Troutwine Estates Dev. Co., LLC v. Comsub Design & Eng’g, Inc., 854
N.E.2d 890, 898–99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Because the Indiana Business Flexibility Act
provides protections to limited liability companies like those of corporations, to circum-
vent those protections we apply an analysis similar to that for determining the personal
liability of a corporation’s officers.”).
229. See, e.g., Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, L.L.C., 768 So. 2d 298, 301–03 (La. Ct. App.
2000) (considering whether to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to an
LLC).
230. See, e.g., Retropolis, Inc. v. 14th Street Dev. LLC, 797 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 2005)
(using the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in the context of an LLC).
231. See, e.g., Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002) (“We can
discern no reason, in either law or policy, to treat LLCs differently than we treat
corporations.”).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Allen v. Dackman,232 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a member of an LLC could be held personally liable for the lead
paint poisoning suffered by illegal occupants of a dwelling owned by
the LLC.233  The court held that the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Dackman because a reasonable trier of fact
could find that Dackman, an LLC member, controlled the property at
issue and personally participated in the alleged tort.234  The court’s
reasoning was broken down into four separate steps: (1) whether the
lower courts had correctly interpreted the Housing Code,235 (2)
whether Dackman could be considered an owner of the property by
controlling the title,236 (3) whether Dackman’s position as a member
of an LLC protected him from individual liability,237 and (4) whether
Dackman owed a duty to the petitioners.238
Judge Greene, writing for the majority, primarily focused his
opinion on the Housing Code to determine whether the lower courts
were correct in finding that Dackman could not be held liable as a
matter of law.239  At the outset, the court stated that the Mayor and
the Baltimore City Council intended the Housing Code to be “‘liber-
ally construed to effectuate [its] purposes.’”240  The court noted that
section 310(a) of the Housing Code required all owners of property
within the city to be in compliance with all provisions of the Housing
Code.241  The Housing Code, the court continued, further defined
232. 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).
233. 413 Md. at 141–42, 991 A.2d at 1221 (concluding “that the trial court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of [Dackman]”).
234. Id. at 160, 991 A.2d at 1232–33.
235. Id. at 142–45, 991 A.2d at 1221–23.
236. Id. at 145–52, 991 A.2d at 1223–28.
237. Id. at 152–56, 991 A.2d at 1228–30.
238. Id. at 156–59, 991 A.2d at 1230–32.
239. Id. at 141–42, 991 A.2d at 1221 (explaining that the court must interpret the Hous-
ing Code to decide this case).  Judge Greene was joined by Chief Judge Bell, Judge Battag-
lia, Judge Murphy, and Judge Barbera.
240. Id. at 143, 991 A.2d at 1222 (alteration in original) (quoting HOUSING CODE
§ 103(b)).  Interpreting the Housing Code, the court found that the purposes of the Hous-
ing Code were to (1) provide minimum requirements for the protection of the health and
safety of owners and operators of dwellings, (2) establish standards to make dwellings safe,
sanitary, and fit for human habitation, and (3) assign responsibilities upon owners, opera-
tors, and occupants of dwellings. Id. (quoting HOUSING CODE § 103(a)).
241. Id. at 144, 991 A.2d at 1223 (stating that “any ‘owner or operator of a property
subject to this Code shall be responsible for compliance with all of the provisions of the
Code’” (quoting HOUSING CODE § 310(a))).  The specific provision that Dackman was ac-
cused of violating states that “‘every building . . . used or occupied as a dwelling . . . be kept
in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human habitation.’” Id. at 145, 991 A.2d at
1223 (quoting HOUSING CODE § 702(a)).  The court highlighted that this requirement of
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“owner” as any person or entity who “owns, holds, or controls” title to
the property.242  The court reasoned that the City Council specifically
defined the term “owner” as not only the person or entity owning title
but also as those who hold or control title.243
Because the parties agreed that Dackman did not own or hold
the title to the property, the court considered whether Dackman exer-
cised “control” over the title to the property.244  The court found that
the term “control” meant that the person or entity in question must
have had an ability to change or affect the title to the property at
issue.245  The court explained that a reasonable trier of fact could
have answered this question in the affirmative because Dackman (1)
was responsible for the day-to-day operations of Hard Assets, (2) exe-
cuted the deed certificate for Hard Assets to acquire the property, (3)
signed the complaint seeking to remove the petitioners from the
property, and (4) signed the deed when Hard Assets sold the prop-
erty.246  The court further stated that even if Dackman did not actually
do these things, the trier of fact could find that Dackman had the
“ability” to do so, which would have been sufficient to establish
control.247
“good repair and safe condition” includes that “‘[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and
windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint and paper.’”
Id. (quoting HOUSING CODE § 703(c)(3)).
242. Id. at 144–45, 991 A.2d at 1223 (explaining that an owner is “ ‘any person, firm,
corporation . . . who . . . owns, holds, or controls the whole or any part of the freehold or
leasehold title to any dwelling or dwelling unit, with or without accompanying actual pos-
session’” (quoting HOUSING CODE § 105(jj))).  The Allens specifically declined to advance
the argument on appeal that Dackman was an operator under the Housing Code. Id. at
144 n.10, 991 A.2d at 1223 n.10.
243. Id. at 148, 991 A.2d at 1225 (“[T]he Housing Code by its terms showed that the
enacting body—in this case, the City Council—intended for the term ‘owner’ to have a
broader meaning than it does in the traditional sense.”).
244. Id. at 145–52, 991 A.2d at 1223–28.  The trial court, the court explained, found that
Dackman could not have been an owner of the property, see supra notes 26–27, and the R
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, see supra notes 30–32. R
245. Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226 (explaining that “[t]his definition is consis-
tent with the common definition of the term ‘control’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
353 (8th ed. 2004))).
246. Id.  The court found the fact that Dackman never visited the property or intended
to lease the property to be irrelevant to the determination of whether Dackman was an
owner of the property. Id. at 151, 991 A.2d at 1227.  In considering whether Dackman
acted “reasonably” to ensure compliance with the Housing Code, the trier of fact, the court
noted, could consider, for example, that the Allens were occupying the property illegally.
Id. at 151–52 (explaining that “[t]he Court is not in a position . . . to determine whether
[Dackman’s] actions were reasonable” because “[b]efore us is whether the trial court prop-
erly granted [Dackman’s] motion for summary judgment”).
247. Id. at 150, 991 A.2d at 1226.
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Next, the court found that Dackman’s position as a member in an
LLC did not protect him from possible liability in this case.248  Al-
though generally members of an LLC are not liable for torts commit-
ted by the LLC, individuals may be liable for torts that they
“‘personally commit[,] . . . inspire[,] or participate[ ] in, even though
performed in the name of an artificial body.’”249  The court explained
that the MLLCA only protects members of an LLC from liability
“solely by reason” of being a member of an LLC.250  Therefore, the
member of an LLC may be liable for the torts he personally commits,
inspires, or participates in because the member personally committed
a wrong, and this wrong is not solely by reason of being a member of
an LLC.251
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the
trier of fact could find Dackman personally liable for the alleged inju-
ries because the evidence showed that Dackman was the only individ-
ual who ran the day-to-day operations of Hard Assets.252  These facts
were sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that Dackman, an
LLC member, committed, inspired, or participated in a violation of
the Housing Code.253
Then, the court stated that the Housing Code did impose a duty
upon Dackman in regard to the protection of the petitioners.254  The
court explained that the plaintiff must prove only two things “to estab-
lish a prima facie case of negligence under the Housing Code: ‘(a) the
violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class
248. Id. at 152, 991 A.2d at 1228.
249. Id. at 152–53, 991 A.2d at 1228 (quoting Metromedia Co. v. WCBM Md., Inc., 327
Md. 514, 520, 610 A.2d 791, 794 (1992)).  The court also stated that an individual may be
personally liable if that person “‘is present on a daily basis during commission of the tort’”
and orders the commission of the tort. Id. (quoting MaryCLE v. First Choice, 166 Md.
App. 481, 528, 890 A.2d 818, 845 (2006)) (explaining that the court agreed with other
jurisdictions that have applied these principles to members of an LLC).
250. Id. at 154, 991 A.2d at 1229.
251. Id.  The court’s entire examination of any potential conflict between the Housing
Code and the MLLCA is contained within one footnote of the opinion. See id. at 154 n.15,
991 A.2d at 1229 n.15 (stating that the court rejected the argument that this interpretation
of the Housing Code and the MLLCA were inconsistent).
252. Id. at 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1230.  The court then proceeded to present a list of
hypotheticals in which the reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman committed,
inspired, or participated in the alleged tort: Dackman could have “personally directed
someone else to inspect or maintain the property,” “directed someone else not to inspect
or maintain the property,” or “may have chosen not to direct anyone to inspect or main-
tain the property.” Id.
253. Id. at 154 n.15, 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1229 n.15, 1230.
254. Id. at 156–58, 991 A.2d at 1230–31.  Dackman argued that the Housing Code did
not impose a duty upon owners in regard to the illegal occupants or a duty upon owners
who did not lease or intend to lease the dwelling. Id. at 156, 991 A.2d at 1230.
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of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation
proximately caused the injury complained of.’”255  After looking to
the purpose of the Housing Code, the court concluded that the Hous-
ing Code clearly intended to protect all “ ‘occupants of dwellings’” in
the City of Baltimore.256  This conclusion was supported by the Hous-
ing Code’s definition of the term “occupant” as the actual person who
uses the dwelling.257  This reasoning led the court to hold that
Dackman owed the petitioners a duty of care regardless of whether
the petitioners had occupied the premises illegally.258  This same rea-
soning also led the court to hold that Dackman owed the petitioners a
duty of care regardless of whether Dackman ever intended to lease the
dwelling.259  The court recognized that this reasoning would impose a
“far-reaching duty” upon the owners of property but nonetheless con-
cluded that such an interpretation was supported by “the explicit in-
tent of the City Council.”260
Judge Harrell dissented, arguing that Dackman never had “‘an
ability to change or affect’” title in his individual capacity.261  Judge
Harrell agreed with the court that the key issue to determining the
outcome of this case was whether Dackman qualified as an owner
under the Housing Code.262  The main distinction for Judge Harrell,
however, was whether Dackman had “‘an ability to change or affect’”
the title “in his individual capacity.”263  Judge Harrell argued that any
255. Id. (quoting Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616, 621
(2003)).  After these steps have been established, “the trier of fact must determine whether
the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Brooks, 378 Md. at 79,
835 A.2d at 621).
256. Id. at 156–57, 991 A.2d at 1230 (emphasis omitted) (quoting HOUSING CODE
§ 103(a)(1)) (“The Housing Code specifically stated that it was intended to ‘establish and
maintain basic minimum requirements, standards, and conditions essential for the protec-
tion of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public and . . . occupants of
dwellings in the City of Baltimore.’” (emphasis added by court) (quoting HOUSING CODE
§ 103(a)(1))).
257. Id. (“The Code defined an ‘occupant’ as ‘the person who actually uses or has pos-
session of the premises.’” (quoting HOUSING CODE § 105(gg))).
258. Id. at 157–58, 991 A.2d at 1231.  The court also explained that the usual common
law rule that a landowner owes a lesser standard of care to a trespasser is inapplicable in
this case because of the existence of the statutorily prescribed duty imposed by Housing
Code. Id. at 157, 991 A.2d at 1231.
259. Id. at 158–59, 991 A.2d at 1232.  The court stated that although the Housing Code
is most often applied against landlords, no court opinion has ever stated that the duties
imposed by the Housing Code are limited to landlords who rented property. Id. at 159
n.20, 991 A.2d at 1232 n.20.
260. Id. at 159 n.22, 991 A.2d at 1232 n.22.
261. Id. at 160–61, 991 A.2d at 1233 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  Judge Harrell was joined
by Judge Adkins.
262. Id. at 160, 991 A.2d at 1233.
263. Id. at 160–61, 991 A.2d at 1233.
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ability which Dackman possessed to change or affect title arose solely
by virtue of his position as a member of Hard Assets.264
Judge Harrell explained that the actions undertaken by Dackman
on behalf of Hard Assets “cannot form the basis for the conclusion
that [Dackman], in his individual capacity, possessed the ‘ability to
change or affect’ the title to the property.”265  Instead, Judge Harrell
stated that all corporate entities must act by necessity through an ac-
tual person.266  Hard Assets was the sole party capable of changing or
affecting title to the property.267  Therefore only Hard Assets—not
Dackman—was the owner of the property, and Dackman could not be
subject to individual liability.268
IV. ANALYSIS
In Allen v. Dackman, the court held that an individual member of
an LLC could be personally liable under the Housing Code if the trier
of fact finds that the member was the “owner” of property by having
the ability to change or affect the title even though the property was
purchased in the name of the LLC and finds that the member “per-
sonally committed, inspired or participated in” the alleged tort.269
The court’s holding casts doubt upon the liability shield of an LLC by
exposing individual members to personal liability for the obligations
of the LLC.  The court could have properly balanced the competing
interests of tort and corporate law by instead creating a three part
analysis: (1) interpreting the Housing Code to require the legal ability
to change or affect title,270 (2) interpreting the MLLCA to protect
members from liability when acting in the good faith service of the
LLC,271 and (3) applying the well-settled doctrine of piercing the cor-
porate veil to LLCs.272  A member who fails any of these three steps
could rightfully be held personally liable.273  Although this reasoning
264. Id. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1233–34.  Likewise, “any actions undertaken by [Dackman]
regarding the title to the subject property were undertaken solely in his capacity as a member
of Hard Assets.” Id., 991 A.2d at 1234.
265. Id.  The actions taken by Dackman included signing the deed when Hard Assets
acquired the property and when Hard Assets sold the property. Id.
266. Id. (“[A]lthough Hard Assets acted, of necessity, through one of its individual
members, namely, [Dackman], Hard Assets nevertheless was the entity that maintained the
‘ability to change or affect’ the title to the property.”).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 141–42, 145, 991 A.2d at 1221, 1223–24 (majority opinion).
270. See infra Part IV.A.1.
271. See infra Part IV.B.2.
272. See infra Part IV.C.
273. See infra Part IV.A–C.
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would have led to a different outcome in the instant case, this analysis
would have properly weighed the competing interests and would hold
an LLC member personally liable in cases with the appropriate facts.
A. Dackman Should Not Be Held Personally Liable Under the Housing
Code
The court first analyzed whether Dackman was an owner under
the Housing Code in order to impose personal liability.274  The court
held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman was an
owner because he had the ability to change or affect title to the prop-
erty in question.275  In so holding, the court improperly exposes indi-
vidual members of an LLC to personal liability by reading the term
“control” broadly to encompass individuals who act for the LLC.276
The court should have properly imposed the tort liability on the
owner of property by defining control as requiring the legal ability to
change or affect title.277  Applying this definition to the current case
would result in finding that Dackman was not an owner under the
Housing Code and that a prima facie case of negligence had not been
shown.278
1. Dackman Should Not Be Considered an Owner Under the
Housing Code
The court should have properly imposed tort liability on the true
owner of the property by interpreting the term “control” as requiring
the legal ability to change or affect title.  The majority and the dissent
correctly stated that a person controls title by having an ability to
change or affect the title.279  The majority, however, ignored the fact
that Dackman never possessed any ability, as an individual, to change
274. See supra text accompanying notes 239–47. R
275. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md.132, 145, 991 A.2d 1216, 1223–24 (2010).
276. See infra Part IV.A.1.
277. See infra Part IV.A.1.  Those who have the “legal ability” to change or affect title
include all people or entities who own the fee simple or some lesser estate in the property.
See, e.g., Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. 576, 583, 810 A.2d 938, 942–43
(2002) (explaining that a mortgagee, a mortgagor, and the holder of a ground rent lease
may all properly be understood as the legal owner of property).  There may in fact be
“‘different estates in the same property, vested in different persons, and each be an owner
thereof.’” Id., 810 A.2d at 942 (quoting Weinberg v. Balt. & Annapolis R.R. Co., 200 Md.
160, 166, 88 A.2d 575, 577–78 (1888)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. See infra Part IV.A.2.
279. Allen, 413 Md. at 160, 991 A.2d at 1233 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the
Majority Opinion that the correct determination as to whether [Dackman] qualifies as an
‘owner’ . . . depends necessarily upon whether [Dackman] had ‘an ability to change or
affect’ the title to the property . . . .”).
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or affect the title, while the dissent highlighted this.280  Hard Assets
was at all relevant times the only entity that ever possessed the legal
ability to change or affect title.281
Applying the reasoning of Shipley v. Perlberg282 and Dyer v. Otis
Warren Real Estate Co.,283 it is possible to support both the rule of the
majority and the dissent.  On the one hand, these cases most clearly
support the dissent’s rule that an owner must have the legal ability to
control title.284  Similar to the corporation in Shipley, at all relevant
times Hard Assets owned the property in question.285  Similar to the
leasing agent in Dyer, Dackman was merely complying with state law
when he took action with regard to the property.286  Also, no evidence
showed that Dackman had any knowledge of the alleged wrongful
conduct.287  Thus, holding Dackman, an LLC member, liable when
only the LLC had the legal ability to control title appears inconsistent.
On the other hand, Shipley and Dyer may be distinguishable from Allen.
Shipley contained facts showing that the corporate director did not
handle the rental properties or the management of the company.288
In Dyer, the leasing agent was a mere broker who lacked “express au-
280. Id. at 160–62, 991 A.2d at 1233–34.  Dackman never possessed this ability because
at all relevant times, Hard Assets was the only entity that bought and was capable of legally
selling the property. Id. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1234.
281. Id.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 51–58. R
283. See supra text accompanying notes 59–67. R
284. See Allen, 413 Md. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1234 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
285. Compare Shipley v. Perlberg, 140 Md. App. 257, 277, 780 A.2d 396, 407 (2001)
(“The evidence is undisputed that Barbara Realty Corporation owned the subject property
during the relevant time period.  There is no evidence that Perlberg had title to the subject
property or exercised ownership in the manner contemplated by the Code.”), abrogated by
Allen, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216, with Allen, 413 Md. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1234 (Harrell, J.,
dissenting) (“It is undisputed that Hard Assets, LLC, acquired, held, and sold the title to
the subject property.”).
286. Compare Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. 576, 589–91, 810 A.2d 938,
946–47 (2002) (explaining that the acts of the leasing agent do not constitute control
because he “was merely complying with Federal disclosure requirements,” delivering pos-
session with an agreement to purchase property, delivering certain documents, and could
possibly receive a commission), with Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226 (majority opin-
ion) (explaining that Dackman executed the deed certificate to buy the property, the deed
certificate to sell the property, and the complaint removing the Allens from the property).
287. Allen, 413 Md. at 139–40, 991 A.2d at 1220 (citing Allen v. Dackman, 184 Md. App.
1, 4–6, 964 A.2d 210, 212–13 (2009)); see also Shipley, 140 Md. App. at 278, 780 A.2d at 408
(“[A] plaintiff must show that the individual defendant at least had knowledge of and
acquiesced in the wrong.”).
288. Shipley, 140 Md. App. at 278, 780 A.2d at 407 (“There was no evidence that [the
corporate officer] had ‘charge, care, or control’ over the property.  [The corporate of-
ficer] testified that he was not involved in renting properties and had never visited the
subject property.”).
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thority to sell the property.”289  In Allen, however, the court held that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman was an owner be-
cause he was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets, exe-
cuted the deed certificate to acquire the property, signed the
complaint seeking to remove the Allens from the property, and signed
the deed when the LLC sold the property.290
Based on Shipley and Dyer, however, the dissent’s rule of what is
required is more persuasive.  To the extent these precedents conflict
with the dissent’s rule that requires an owner to have the legal ability
to change or affect title, they should be abandoned.  The Allen major-
ity disagreed with the dissent’s rule based on canons of statutory inter-
pretation that require reading the statutory language in a way that
does not render any part of the statute “‘superfluous or nugatory.’”291
The Allen majority believed the additional word “control” must have
evidenced an intent by the City Council to apply the term “owner” to a
wider group of individuals beyond the traditional understanding of
this term.292  The court reasoned that this wider group of individuals
includes all people with the ability to change or affect title.293  It is
equally plausible, however, that adding “control” to the definition of
owner, under section 105(jj) of the Housing Code, was evidence of
the City Council’s intent to expand the definition of owner to all indi-
viduals with the legal ability to change or affect title.294  The court, for
example, has treated a mortgagee as the owner of the property.295
The court has explained that the mortgagor also possesses the legal
ability to change or affect title.296  This example demonstrates that
inclusion of the term “control” could reasonably evidence an intent by
the City Council to define an owner under the Housing Code as all
individuals who have the legal ability to change or affect title.297  This
289. Dyer, 371 Md. at 590–91, 810 A.2d at 946–47.
290. Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226.
291. Id. at 148, 991 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Dyer, 371 Md. at 581, 810 A.2d at 941).
292. Id. at 148–49, 991 A.2d at 1225–26.
293. Id.
294. “‘An owner is not necessarily one owning the fee-simple, or one having in the prop-
erty the highest estate it will admit of.  One having a lesser estate may be an owner, and,
indeed, there may be different estates in the same property, vested in different persons,
and each be an owner thereof.’” Dyer, 371 Md. at 583, 810 A.2d at 942 (emphasis omitted
by court) (quoting Weinberg v. Balt. & Annapolis R.R. Co., 200 Md. 160, 166, 88 A.2d 575,
577–78 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id. (citing Mayor of Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560, 563, 61 A. 467, 468 (1905)).
296. Id., 810 A.2d at 942–43 (citing IA Constr. Corp. v. Carney, 341 Md. 703, 716–17,
672 A.2d 650, 657 (1996)).  In addition, the court has stated that the holder of a ground
rent lease is considered a legal owner of property. Id., 810 A.2d at 943.
297. See supra note 294. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR407.txt unknown Seq: 38 10-JUN-11 10:44
1208 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:1171
interpretation of the term “control” within the Housing Code does
not render the statutory language superfluous.
Interpreting the term “control” as requiring the legal ability to
change or affect title is supported by a comparison of sections 310(a)
and 310(b) of the Housing Code.298  Section 310(b) specifically “ad-
dresses the liability of individual officers and directors of a corpora-
tion for violation of the Code.”299  To prove a violation of the Housing
Code under section 310(b), the plaintiff must show that the officer or
director “had knowledge of and acquiesced in” the wrongful act.300
Therefore, holding an individual personally liable under section
310(a), which directs liability for being an owner or operator of the
property, for merely acting as an officer or director would be inconsis-
tent with the knowledge requirement of section 310(b).301  Interpret-
ing the term “control” within section 310(a) to require the legal
ability to change or affect title would solve this inconsistency.  Hard
Assets was at all relevant times the entity that maintained the legal
ability to change or affect title to the subject property.302  Hard Assets,
therefore, could have been held liable under section 310(a) as an
owner of the property even without knowledge of the alleged viola-
tion.303  Because Dackman, as an individual, never possessed the legal
ability to change or affect title to the subject property, he is not an
owner of the property and should not be held liable under section
310(a).304
298. Compare HOUSING CODE § 310(a) (“Any person who is either an owner or operator
of a property subject to this Code shall be responsible for compliance with all of the provi-
sions of the code.”), with id. § 310(b) (“Whenever a corporation shall violate . . . this Code,
such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agents
of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts . . . or who
shall knowingly have acquiesced in any failure to act . . . .”).
299. Shipley v. Perlberg, 140 Md. App. 257, 278, 780 A.2d 396, 408 (2001), abrogated by
Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).
300. Id. (“To prove liability under section 310(b), a plaintiff must show that the individ-
ual defendant at least had knowledge of and acquiesced in the wrong committed.”).
301. Id. (“To hold a person liable under section 310(a) merely because he or she was
involved in setting up a corporation, or acted as officer or director, would be inconsistent
with the requirements of section 310(b).”).
302. Allen, 413 Md. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1234 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
303. See Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 72, 835 A.2d 616, 617 (2003) (stat-
ing that the owner of property, in this case a Baltimore City landlord, may be held liable
under the Housing Code without knowledge of the alleged violation).
304. Cf. Shipley, 140 Md. App. at 279, 780 A.2d at 408 (“We hold, therefore, that [the
corporate officer] is not liable under section 310(a) of the Baltimore City Code.”).
Dackman, therefore, could only have been held liable under section 310(b) as an officer
or director if he participated in or had knowledge of and acquiesced in the wrongful
conduct.
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Adopting an interpretation of the term “owner” to include all in-
dividuals who have the legal ability to change or affect title is also
supported by the underlying theory of agency law.  It is a well settled
principle of agency law that corporations are incapable of acting by
themselves and therefore require the action of individuals.305  The
majority’s reasoning, however, ignores that all business entities must
necessarily act through human beings.306  Dackman, like the leasing
agent in Dyer, was an agent of Hard Assets who was acting with the
purpose of bringing to fruition the desires of the LLC.307  Agency law
provides that actions taken by an agent within the agent’s express au-
thority to bind the principal are properly understood as the actions of
the principal.308  Dackman’s actions taken within his authority as an
agent of Hard Assets are properly understood as actions of Hard As-
sets, not actions of Dackman as an individual.309  Simply because
Dackman was an agent of Hard Assets with authority to sell the prop-
erty on behalf of Hard Assets does not make Dackman, as an individ-
ual, an owner of the property.310  At all relevant times, Hard Assets was
the sole owner of the property because Hard Assets was the sole entity
that had the legal ability to change or affect title and, of necessity, had
to act through Dackman.311
305. See Bob Holding Corp. v. Normal Realty Corp., 223 Md. 260, 266, 164 A.2d 457, 460
(1960) (noting that a corporation can act only through agents).
306. Allen, 413 Md. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1233–34 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“The Majority
Opinion, however, ignores the fact that any ability possessed by [Dackman] to ‘change or
affect’ the title to the property came solely by virtue of his position as a member of Hard Assets,
LLC.”).
307. See id., 991 A.2d at 1234 (“[A]ny actions undertaken by [Dackman] regarding the
title to the subject property were undertaken solely in his capacity as a member of Hard As-
sets.”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. 576, 590–91, 810 A.2d 938, 946–47
(explaining that the defendant was a leasing agent of the subject property and delivered
certain documents to the plaintiff but did not have the necessary control over the
property).
308. Johnson v. Md. Trust Co., 176 Md. 557, 565, 6 A.2d 383, 386 (1939) (“[T]he acts of
corporate officers and agents are binding upon the principal when, and only when, they
are performed within the scope of their authority, either express or implied.”); see supra
note 191. R
309. Cf. Johnson, 176 Md. at 565, 6 A.2d at 386; Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226
(majority opinion) (explaining that the actions taken by Dackman were within his scope of
authority as a director of Hard Assets).
310. See Allen, 413 Md. at 162, 991 A.2d at 1234 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“The actions
undertaken by [Dackman] on behalf of Hard Assets . . . cannot form the basis for the
conclusion that [Dackman], in his individual capacity, possessed the ‘ability to change or
affect’ the title to the property.”).
311. Id. (“[Dackman] may not be held liable personally to [the Allens] because he does
not qualify, in his individual capacity, as an ‘owner’ within the meaning of § 310(a) of
the . . . Housing Code.”).
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2. Because Dackman Did Not “Control” the Property, There Was No
Showing of a Prima Facie Case of Negligence
Properly interpreting the term “control” as requiring the legal
ability to change or affect title would negate the prima facie case of
negligence against Dackman.  A prima facie case of negligence under
the Housing Code requires a showing of two elements: “(a) the viola-
tion of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of
persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proxi-
mately caused the injury complained of.”312  This could not have been
established against Dackman.  Dackman did not control the title to
the subject property, as explained above, because he lacked the legal
ability to change or affect title and thus could not be considered the
owner of the subject property.313  Dackman therefore did not violate
the Housing Code because section 310(a) only imposes duties upon
the owner of the property,314 and therefore the case against him
should have been dismissed.
B. Dackman Should Not Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Hard
Assets
Even if a member of an LLC is not an “owner” under the Housing
Code, the court may still apply common law doctrines to hold that
member personally liable for the obligations of the LLC.315  The court
held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman person-
ally committed the alleged tort and that Dackman’s status as a mem-
ber of an LLC did not protect him from liability.316  In so holding, the
court mistakenly disregarded the economically important liability
shield of an LLC by inappropriately making Dackman personally lia-
ble for what is essentially the tortious conduct of the LLC.317  The
court could have properly weighed the interests of tort and corporate
law by instead holding that (1) a reasonable trier of fact could not
find that Dackman participated in or directed the commission of a
tort,318 and (2) the MLLCA protects members from personal liability
when they act in the good faith service of the LLC.319
312. Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616, 621 (2003); see supra
Part II.A.2.
313. See supra Part IV.A.1.
314. HOUSING CODE § 310(a).
315. See infra Part IV.B.1.
316. Allen, 413 Md. at 152, 991 A.2d at 1228 (majority opinion).
317. See infra Part IV.B.2.a–b.
318. See infra Part IV.B.1.
319. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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1. Dackman Did Not Personally Commit or Direct the Commission of
a Tort
The court should have held that a reasonable trier of fact could
not find that Dackman either personally committed a tort or directed
the commission of a tort.  In Maryland, corporate officers may be held
liable “for those torts which they personally commit, or which they
inspire or participate in, even though performed in the name of an
artificial body,”320 or if the corporate officer “is present on a daily ba-
sis during commission of the tort and gives direct orders that cause
commission of the tort.”321  Therefore, the court was correct in apply-
ing this rule for liability of corporate officers to the members of an
LLC.322  The court, however, misapplied the facts and instead should
have found that a reasonable trier of fact could not find that Dackman
personally committed a tort or directed the commission of a tort.323
a. Dackman Did Not Personally Commit a Tort
The court should have properly applied the facts of this case to
the legal precedent to hold that a reasonable trier of fact could not
find that Dackman personally committed a tort.  Holding a member
of an LLC liable for personally committing a tort in the name of the
LLC requires active participation by the individual member and re-
quires the member to have actual knowledge of the alleged tort.324  In
this case, the court held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that
Dackman personally committed, inspired, or participated in the tort
of negligent maintenance.325  The court then proceeded to present a
list of hypothetical facts to explain what constituted sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable trier of fact to find Dackman personally liable
for the injuries, which included that Dackman may have directed
someone else to inspect the property, directed someone else not to
inspect the property, or not directed anyone to inspect the prop-
320. Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972); see also supra Part
II.C.1.a.
321. T-Up v. Consumer Prot. Div., 145 Md. App. 27, 72, 801 A.2d 173, 199 (2002); see
also supra Part II.C.1.b.
322. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 152–53, 155–56, 991 A.2d 1216, 1228, 1230 (2010).
323. See infra Part IV.B.1.a–b.
324. See Tedrow, 265 Md. at 550–51, 290 A.2d at 802 (“If the officer takes no part in the
commission of the tort committed by the corporation, he is not personally liable . . . .  It
would seem, therefore, that an officer or director is not liable for torts of which he has no
knowledge, or to which he has not consented.” (citations omitted)).
325. Allen, 413 Md. at 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1230.
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erty.326  This analysis, however, does not meet the legal standard set
forth in Maryland case law.327
In this case, there was no evidence of active participation on the
part of Dackman that is comparable to the corporate officer in Brock
Bridge Ltd. Partnership v. Development Facilitators, Inc.328  Instead, it ap-
pears that Dackman was merely an instrument of Hard Assets, who
acted on behalf of Hard Assets but did not exercise his own profes-
sional judgment.329  First, there was no direct evidence that Dackman
directly participated in the commission of a tort.  Unlike the corpo-
rate president in Brock Bridge, who could have been held liable be-
cause he calculated and provided cost estimates for the company,
there was no evidence that Dackman “exercised his own professional
judgment and skill.”330  Instead, the Allen court concluded that a rea-
sonable trier of fact could find that Dackman actively participated be-
cause he ran the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets.331  This conclusion,
however, falls short of sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find
that Dackman personally committed, inspired, or participated in the
act; there was no evidence that Dackman participated in the mainte-
nance of the property.332  The court implicitly recognized the weak-
ness of its analysis by immediately using this fact to support a list of
hypotheticals, which could prove actual participation.333  The court,
however, failed to cite to any specific fact, beyond the general asser-
tion that Dackman ran the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets, which
showed that Dackman was more than “merely an instrument” of the
LLC.334
326. Id. at 155, 991 A.2d at 1230.
327. See, e.g., Brock Bridge Ltd. P’ship v. Dev. Facilitators, Inc., 114 Md. App. 144, 167,
689 A.2d 622, 634 (1997) (explaining that an officer of a corporation was more than
“merely an instrument” of the company and therefore actively participated in and could be
personally liable for the tort).
328. Compare Allen, 413 Md. at 149–50, 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1226, 1230 (explaining that
Dackman ran the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets, executed the deed to buy the property,
executed the deed to sell the property, and signed the complaint to have the Allens re-
moved from the property), with Brock Bridge, 114 Md. App. at 167, 689 A.2d at 634 (stating
that the defendant “exercised his own professional judgment and skill in making the cost
estimates” for the construction site and therefore could be liable for the negligence).
329. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. R
330. Brock Bridge, 114 Md. App. at 167, 689 A.2d at 634; see also supra text accompanying
notes 134–37. R
331. Allen, 413 Md. at 150, 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1226, 1230.
332. See Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md. 520, 527, 41 A.2d 473, 476 (1945) (“The allega-
tion that [the corporate directors] ‘erected or caused to be erected’ the wall in question
seems to fall short of alleging that they personally participated in the work.”).
333. See supra text accompanying note 326. R
334. See supra text accompanying notes 329–31. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR407.txt unknown Seq: 43 10-JUN-11 10:44
2011] ALLEN V. DACKMAN 1213
Second, Dackman had no knowledge of the alleged tort.
Dackman never once visited the property and never inspected the
property before or after Hard Assets purchased it.335  Dackman never
intended to lease the premises, was unaware that the Allens were re-
siding at the property, and never took action to maintain the prop-
erty.336  Ms. Allen never contacted Dackman and never tried to
communicate any information regarding the maintenance of the
property to Dackman.337  Thus, it is clear from the facts that Dackman
had no knowledge of the alleged tort or knowledge regarding the
maintenance of the property.  For these reasons, a reasonable trier of
fact could not find that Dackman personally committed the alleged
tort of negligent maintenance and had knowledge about the mainte-
nance of the property.338
b. Dackman Did Not Direct the Commission of a Tort
The court should have next held that a reasonable trier of fact
could not find that Dackman directed the commission of a tort.  Hold-
ing a member of an LLC liable for directing the commission of a tort
requires that the member have knowledge of the alleged tort because
the member must be present on a daily basis and direct the commis-
sion of the tort.339  In Allen, as opposed to MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice
Internet, Inc., there is no evidence that Dackman ever directed anyone
else to take any specific action regarding the maintenance of the
property in question.340  It is conceded that Dackman did indeed run
the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets and was thus present on a daily
335. Allen, 413 Md. at 151, 991 A.2d at 1227.
336. Id.
337. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. R
338. See Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550–51, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972) (explaining
that an officer of a business must actively participate in and have knowledge of the alleged
tort before the officer can be held liable for personally committing a tort).
339. See supra Part II.C.1.b.  The court did not actually conclude that a reasonable trier
of fact could find that Dackman directed the commission of the tort because the court
instead held that Dackman could have committed, inspired, or participated in the tort
itself. Allen, 413 Md. at 155–56, 991 A.2d at 1230.  In its analysis of the question, however,
the court described how a reasonable trier of fact could find Dackman personally liable for
possibly directing someone else to take some action regarding the maintenance of the
property. See supra text accompanying note 326. R
340. The court explained that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman was
personally liable based on the facts that Dackman ran the day-to-day affairs of Hard Assets,
executed the deed to buy the property, executed the deed to sell the property, and signed
the complaint to have the Allens removed from the property. Allen, 413 Md. at 149–50,
155–56, 991 A.2d at 1226, 1230.  In MaryCLE v. First Choice Internet, Inc., in contrast, there
was actual evidence showing that the president contracted with a third party and directed
that third party to send mass advertising e-mails, which was held sufficient to surpass a
motion for summary judgment.  166 Md. App. 481, 530, 890 A.2d 818, 846–47 (2006).
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basis.341  But, the court’s analysis still fails because Dackman had no
knowledge of the tort,342 and there is no evidence that Dackman di-
rected anyone to commit the alleged tort.343  Likewise, there was no
evidence to support the court’s list of hypothetical facts, which it rea-
soned would be sufficient to show that Dackman directed a person to
take a specific action regarding the maintenance of the property.344
Unlike the president in MaryCLE, who directed the transmission of an
unsolicited mass e-mail, there is no specific evidence showing that
Dackman directed someone to maintain or not maintain the property
in question.345
2. Even if Dackman Was Found Liable for the Torts of Hard Assets,
the MLLCA Should Protect Dackman from Liability
The court properly should have held that the MLLCA protects
members from personal liability when acting in good faith service of
the LLC.346  This rule is supported by the original economic justifica-
tions of an LLC,347 principles of agency law,348 and principles of cor-
porate successor law.349  The LLC was created as a business structure
to provide for the pass-through tax benefits of a partnership and the
liability shield of a corporation.350  Interpreting the extent to which
the liability shield of the LLC extends has proven problematic and
caused a split among states.351  This split has largely resulted from how
courts interpret the phrase “solely by reason” of being a member.352
In Allen, the court mistakenly decided to align Maryland with those
states that have held members of an LLC personally liable regardless
of whether the member was acting in service of the LLC.353  Instead,
341. See supra note 340. R
342. See supra text accompanying notes 335–38. R
343. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. R
344. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. R
345. Compare MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. at 530, 890 A.2d at 846 (“[The President] does not
deny personally arranging to retain the services of Master Mailings to achieve the goal of
transmitting mass advertising emails to, as he phrased it, ‘hundreds of thousands of other
email addresses.’”), with supra text accompanying notes 340–44. R
346. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
347. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
348. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
349. See infra Part IV.B.2.d.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 104–07. R
351. See supra Part II.C.2.
352. See supra Part II.C.2.i–ii.
353. Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 153–54, 991 A.2d 1216, 1228–29 (2010) (“An LLC
member is liable for torts he or she personally commits, inspires, or participates in because
he or she personally committed a wrong, not ‘solely’ because he or she is a member of the
LLC.”); see also supra Part II.C.2.i.
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the court should have held that the MLLCA protects members when
acting in the good faith service of the LLC.354
a. The Court Should Protect Members When Acting in the Good
Faith Service of the LLC
The court properly should have interpreted the phrase “solely by
reason” to protect members from personal liability when acting in the
good faith service of the LLC.  The phrase “solely by reason” implies
that there are circumstances where the member of an LLC should
indeed be held personally liable.355  The Allen court, however, im-
properly applied a narrow interpretation to the phrase “solely by rea-
son” and thereby exposes members of an LLC to an inappropriate
amount of personal liability.
In determining how the court should interpret the phrase “solely
by reason,” two interests should be weighed: (1) not allowing individu-
als to escape tort liability by acting under the mask of a business entity
and (2) encouraging growth and innovation among businesses, espe-
cially small business.356 Weighing these two important interests, the
rule of imposing liability on LLC members should be modeled after
the rule in Resheff, Inc. v. 970 Kent Avenue Associates, LLC: The liability
shield of an LLC should protect its members when acting in the good
faith service of the LLC.357  Under this rule, a member may be held
personally liable when (1) the member acts in his personal interest as
opposed to the interests of the LLC, or (2) the member acts so as to
impair the business of another party for the profit of the LLC or him-
self.358  This rule does not allow members to escape liability for their
personal tortious conduct because members are not protected from
their intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.359  But at the
same time, this rule assures a member that he may act in his role as a
member or manager without fear that every action on behalf of the
354. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
355. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salisbury, Md. v. Handy, No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000).
356. See Vandervoort, supra note 108, at 55 (describing limited liability as a struggle be- R
tween two conflicting goals: encouraging economic development and regulating business
entities).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 182–87. R
358. Resheff, Inc. v. 970 Kent Ave. Assocs., LLC, No. 40337/07, 2009 WL 175039, at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (quoting Joan Hansen & Co., Inc. v. Everlast World’s Boxing
Headquarters Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 384, 391 (App. Div. 2002)).
359. Cf. Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 367, 76 A.2d 566, 570 (1950) (“Agents of
a corporation, in such a matter, cannot hide behind the corporate shield and say they were
acting solely as the agents of the corporation.”).
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LLC could potentially expose him to personal tort liability.360  This
rule more appropriately weighs the interests of tort and corporate law
by holding individuals liable for their personal tortious conduct while
also encouraging the economic growth of LLCs by protecting mem-
bers who act in the good faith service of the LLC.361
b. Good Faith Service Promotes the Original Economic Justifications
for Creating the LLC
The two original justifications for the creation of the LLC as an
available business structure were the existence of the pass-through tax
benefits of a partnership and the liability shield of a corporation in
one single entity.362  Public policy has long supported the view that
“‘[t]he law permits the incorporation of a business for the very pur-
pose of escaping personal liability.’”363  An LLC and its members are
separate legal entities under which the member generally is not liable
for the debts or obligations of the LLC.364  It is perfectly acceptable
that individuals choose to form an LLC with the express purpose of
limiting the liability of its members.  Providing a liability shield for
members who act in the good faith service of the LLC promotes the
original justification of providing members with limited liability.
The economic justifications and, specifically, the concept of lim-
ited liability support an interpretation of the MLLCA that protects
members from personal liability when acting in the good faith service
of the LLC.  The existence of limited liability is designed to foster bus-
iness development and economic efficiency by changing the behavior
of individuals engaged in business activities.365  The passage of the
MLLCA and the creation of a separate legal entity as between the LLC
360. See Joan Hansen, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (“‘To hold otherwise would be dangerous doc-
trine, and would subject corporate officers and directors continually to liability on corpo-
rate contracts and go far toward undermining the limitation of liability which is one of the
principal objects of corporations.’” (quoting In re Brookside Mills, Inc., 94 N.Y.S.2d 509,
518 (App. Div. 1950))).
361. See supra text accompanying note 356. R
362. See supra text accompanying notes 104–07.  This Note acknowledges the existence R
of extensive literature regarding the availability of partnership-like tax benefits enjoyed by
LLCs, but this Note will only discuss the benefit of the liability shield because the opinion
in Allen v. Dackman does not affect the tax benefits enjoyed by LLCs.  For a detailed discus-
sion of the tax benefits enjoyed by LLCs, see generally Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity
for a Venture Capital Start-Up: The Myth of Incorporation, 55 TAX LAW. 923 (2002) (explaining
the tax advantages enjoyed by LLCs over corporations).
363. Joan Hansen, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (quoting Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127
N.E.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. 1955)).
364. Id. (quoting In re Morris, 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (N.Y. 1993)); Allen v. Dackman,
413 Md. 132, 152, 991 A.2d 1216, 1228 (2010).
365. Vandervoort, supra note 108, at 53–55; see supra text accompanying note 109. R
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and its members for liability purposes show a policy choice by the Ma-
ryland General Assembly that should not be disregarded lightly.366
Members of an LLC are well aware of the consequences of their ac-
tions and act on behalf of the LLC accordingly.367  Holding, as the
court did, that LLC members are not protected regardless of whether
they are acting in the service of the LLC could have a dampening
effect on the encouragement of business development and economic
efficiency.368  Imposing liability on members even when acting in the
good faith service of the LLC disincentivizes members from develop-
ing new business opportunities out of fear of subsequent personal lia-
bility.369  Exposing members to personal liability for their good faith
service of the LLC is a dangerous doctrine that may subject individual
members to constant litigation and undermine the principle of lim-
ited liability.370  Encouraging business development is best accom-
plished by enforcing the liability shield created by the MLLCA to
protect members from personal liability when acting in the good faith
service of the LLC.
c. Good Faith Service Is Supported by Principles of Agency Law
A rule protecting LLC members from personal liability when act-
ing in the good faith service of the LLC is supported by legal princi-
ples contained in agency law.371  Agency law provides that the acts of
corporate officers and agents are binding upon the principal when
366. Cf. Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 316 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (“We recognize that the separate existence of a corporate entity for liability purposes
represents a public policy choice, as expressed in Connecticut’s legislation governing the
formulation and regulation of corporations and limited liability companies, and that the
corporate or limited liability form should not be disregarded lightly.” (citing Toshiba Am.
Med. Sys. v. Mobile Med. Sys., 730 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1999))).
367. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 4 (“Managers assume their roles with R
knowledge of the consequences.”).
368. Cf. Hoover, supra note 121 (“It would particularly help small and start-up busi- R
nesses, where investors . . . need the limited liability associated with being a limited
partner . . . .”).
369. Cf. id.; Vandervoort, supra note 108, at 54–55 (“[T]he key economic justification R
for limited liability is based on the premise that apart from the simple shifting of loss from
interest holders to creditors, there is a change in behavior due to the limited liability status
of interest holders.”).
370. See Joan Hansen & Co., Inc. v. Everlast World’s Boxing Headquarters Corp., 744
N.Y.S.2d 384, 390 (App. Div. 2002) (“‘To hold otherwise would be dangerous doctrine,
and would subject corporate officers and directors continually to liability on corporate
contracts and go far toward undermining the limitation of liability which is one of the
principal objects of corporations.’” (quoting In re Brookside Mills, Inc., 94 N.Y.S.2d 509,
518 (App. Div. 1950))).
371. See supra note 191. R
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such acts are performed within the scope of the agent’s authority.372
Actions outside of an agent’s authority or actions adverse to the inter-
est of the business entity cannot be binding upon the principal.373
These principles of agency law support a rule under which the
MLLCA would protect members from liability when acting in the
good faith service of the LLC.  If a tortious act is committed by a mem-
ber in his good faith service to the LLC, that act should be considered
the tortious act of the LLC because the LLC member is acting within
the scope of his authority and binds the LLC.374  Therefore, if the
member is acting in the good faith service of the LLC, the liability
shield should apply, and the proper party to a suit should be the LLC,
not the member.375  If a tortious act is committed without good faith
372. Johnson v. Md. Trust Co., 176 Md. 557, 565, 6 A.2d 383, 386 (1939).
373. See Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 345, 635 A.2d 394, 405 (1994)
(“[K]nowledge of an agent whose interests are adverse to the principal cannot be imputed
to the principal.”); P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc. v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 654, 248 A.2d 473, 477
(1968) (“We have held that a statement made by an agent will not bind his principal until
an agency is established and then only if the statement is within the scope of the agency.”
(citing Deane v. Big Spring Distilling Co. 138 Md. 388, 392–93, 113 A. 891, 893 (1921)));
see also Felland Ltd. P’ship v. Digi-tel Commc’ns, LLC, 384 Md. 520, 531, 864 A.2d 1027,
1034 (2004) (exploring cases that “delineated the general rules for determining whether
an employee’s wrongful acts are within the scope of employment, thereby rendering the
employer liable for such acts”); Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, 160 Md. 534, 540–41, 154
A. 41, 44 (1931) (“[K]nowledge privately acquired by any such agent, and not communi-
cated to his principal or associates, will not be imputed to the corporation in matters in
which the interest of the agent is adverse to its own, even where the agent actively partici-
pates in the transaction.”).
374. A similar principle has been codified by commentators in a legal treatise:
[W]here an agent acts in good faith for the principal under the latter’s direction,
relying upon the principal’s representations as to the legal propriety of the act to
be done, though in fact such act by the agent constitutes a tort, the law requires
indemnity from the principal to the agent, for damages of third persons, and if, as
the result of acts so performed, the agent is mulcted in damages, the principal
must respond to the agent therefore, as well as for the necessary expenses in-
curred in resisting the claims of third persons who were injured in the
transaction.
3 AM. JR. 2D Agency § 244 (2002); cf. Bob Holding Corp. v. Normal Realty Corp., 223 Md.
266, 266–67, 164 A.2d 457, 460–61 (demonstrating that where an attorney acted in service
to his client, the act must be presumed to be the client’s act).
375. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04 (2006) (“A principal is subject to liabil-
ity to a third party . . . when the agent’s conduct is within the scope of the agent’s actual
authority . . . and (1) the agent’s conduct is tortious, or (2) the agent’s conduct, if that of
the principal, would subject the principal to tort liability.”). See generally id. § 7.02 (2006)
(“An agent is subject to tort liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct only
when the agent’s conduct breaches a duty that the agent owes to the third party.”); Bob
Holding Corp., 223 Md. at 266–67, 164 A.2d at 460–61 (explaining that an attorney was free
from liability for giving a termination notice to a third party because the attorney was
acting as an agent for the client, and the action therefore, should be viewed as the action
of the client).
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service, such as intentionally, willfully, or opposed to the interest of
the LLC, then that act should be considered the act of the agent.376
This is appropriate because if the member is not acting in the good
faith service of the LLC, then the member might not be acting within
the scope of the member’s authority.377  Therefore, the liability shield
should not apply, and the proper party to a suit should be the individ-
ual member, not the LLC.378
In Allen, Dackman was at all relevant times acting in the good
faith service of the LLC.  Similar to the attorney in Bob Holding Corp. v.
Normal Realty Corp., all of Dackman’s actions were within his authority
as a member of Hard Assets to bind the LLC.379  Unlike the corporate
officers in Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., it appears that Dackman was
never acting with interests adverse to the LLC.380  Applying these prin-
376. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006) (“An employee acts within the
scope of employment when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a
course of conduct subject to the employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the
scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not in-
tended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”); Hecht, 333 Md. at 346,
635 A.2d at 405 (“[T]he agent cannot reasonably be expected to act upon or communicate
knowledge of his own wrongdoing to the corporation.”).
377. See Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Vill. Condos., Inc., 983 F. Supp.
640, 649 (D. Md. 1997) (“In the absence of clear language, it is well-settled in Maryland
that an agent is liable to third parties injured by his negligence in the improper perform-
ance of a duty.” (citing Consol. Gas Co. v. Conner, 114 Md. 140, 156, 78 A. 725, 728–29
(1910))); 2 MD. LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA § 26 (“An agent is liable to third parties injured by his
negligence in the improper performance of a duty.  The agent may be liable for his own
acts of negligence regardless of whether the principal’s identity has been disclosed.”).  Ac-
cording to principles of agency law, actions taken outside of the agent’s authority are not
binding upon the principal. See supra note 375. R
378. Cf. A. S. Abell Co. v. Sopher, 179 Md. 687, 690, 22 A.2d 462, 463 (1941) (“[W]hen
the undisputed, and uncontradicted evidence clearly discloses that a servant has commit-
ted an act of negligence, at a time when he was not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, . . . ‘it becomes the function of the trial court to declare the owner not liable.’”
(citations omitted) (quoting Wagner v. Page, 179 Md. 465, 470, 20 A.2d 164, 167 (1941)));
cf. Hecht, 333 Md. at 328, 346, 635 A.2d at 396, 405 (explaining that former officers of a
corporation were not protected from potential liability for risking the company’s funds in
highly speculative and risky construction projects because the officers were not acting in
the good faith service of the company).
379. Compare Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 149, 991 A.2d 1216, 1226 (2010) (explain-
ing that the actions taken by Dackman included running the day-to-day operations of Hard
Assets, executing the deed to acquire the property, executing the deed to sell the property,
and signing the complaint to have the Allens removed from the property may have allowed
a reasonable trier of fact to determine that Dackman had the ability to change or affect
title), with Bob Holding Corp. v. Normal Realty Corp., 223 Md. 260, 266–67, 164 A.2d 457,
460–61 (1960) (“While it is true that an attorney does not have blanket authority to act for
a client, it appears that in this case the notice was given under the direction of the vendor,
and must be presumed to be its act.”).
380. Compare Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226 (explaining that the actions taken
by Dackman were required to effectively run the day-to-day operations of Hard Assets), with
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ciples of agency law, Dackman’s actions should be considered the acts
of the LLC, not Dackman, and the proper party to a suit should be
Hard Assets with the liability shield of the MLLCA protecting
Dackman.381
d. Good Faith Service Is Supported by Principles of Corporate
Successor Liability
A rule protecting members from personal liability when acting in
the good faith service of the LLC is supported by legal principles con-
tained in corporate successor law, as well.  Under Maryland law, suc-
cessor corporations are not generally liable for the obligations of a
previous corporation, subject to four specific exceptions.382  The tradi-
tional rule of corporate successor liability and its four exceptions
properly balance the competing interests of tort and corporate law:
The general rule against liability promotes the “free transferability of
assets,” predictability, availability of capital, and mobility in the busi-
ness world.383  But, the four exceptions protect the rights of creditors
and tort claimants in certain appropriate circumstances.384  Most rele-
vant to this case, the fourth exception prohibits a corporation from
escaping tort liability when the transaction between the corporations
was made through acts of fraud or with a lack of good faith.385  This
exception recognizes the interest of tort law in holding tortfeasors lia-
Hecht, 333 Md. at 328, 346, 635 A.2d at 396, 405 (reasoning that the former officers acted
adversely to the company by engaging in highly speculative, risky, and negligently under-
written construction projects and therefore their knowledge could not be imputed to the
corporation).
381. See also infra Part IV.B.2.e (showing why the liability shield should protect Dackman
from personal liability).
382. Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 617, 594 A.2d 564, 566 (1991); Balt. Luggage
Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 290, 562 A.2d 1286, 1289 (1989) (“The general rule of
corporate liability is that, ordinarily, a corporation which acquires the assets of another
corporation is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the predecessor corporation.”);
Michael F. Dow, Recent Decision, Successor Liability and Contract: Maryland Narrowly Con-
strues the “Mere Continuation of the Entity” Exception, 57 MD. L. REV. 642, 645–46 (1998).  For a
list of the four exceptions, see supra note 191. R
383. Dow, supra note 382, at 646–67 (citing Robert J. Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Take- R
over: Nature and Scope of Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 185, 207–08 (1984)).
384. Id. at 647.
385. See Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566 (explaining the fourth exception as
where “‘the transaction was fraudulent, not made in good faith, or made without sufficient
consideration’”); Balt. Luggage Co., 80 Md. App. at 290, 562 A.2d at 1289–90 (explaining
the fourth exception as where “the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liabil-
ity for debts” (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973))).
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ble for the injuries that they cause.386  Absent a showing of fraud or
lack of good faith, however, the law properly recognizes the interest of
corporate law in encouraging business and economic growth.387
These principles of corporate successor liability support an inter-
pretation of the MLLCA that would protect members from liability
when acting in the good faith service of the LLC.  Just as the general
rule of corporate successor liability encourages business interests by
restricting liability,388 if a tortious act is committed by a member in his
good faith service to the LLC, he should be protected by the liability
shield of the MLLCA.389  And, just as the general rule of corporate
successor liability falls under the fourth exception when there is fraud
or a lack of good faith,390 if a member is not acting in the good faith
service of the LLC, the liability shield of the MLLCA should fall.  If a
tortious act is committed without good faith service, such as intention-
ally, willfully, or opposed to the interest of the LLC, then the member
should be held liable for his tortious conduct because such conduct is
the equivalent of fraud and does not deserve protection under Mary-
land law.391  In Allen, Dackman was at all relevant times acting in the
good faith service of the LLC and should therefore be protected by
the liability shield of the MLLCA.392
e. Dackman Was Acting in the Good Faith Service of Hard Assets
A rule that protects members when acting in the good faith ser-
vice of the LLC would support a holding that a reasonable trier of fact
could not find Dackman liable.  First, there was no evidence to show
that Dackman ever acted in his own interest opposed to that of the
LLC.393  The evidence shows that Dackman was at all relevant times
386. See Dow, supra note 382, at 647 (“The four exceptions, alternatively, serve as a coun- R
terbalance to the rule against successor liability by protecting the rights of creditors and
tort claimants when a successor corporation has explicitly or impliedly assumed its prede-
cessor’s liabilities, or attempted a fraudulent evasion of rightful claimants.”).
387. Cf. id. at 646–47 (explaining that absent a showing of one of the four exceptions,
the rule against successor liability is supported by the strong public policy focused on eco-
nomic growth).
388. See supra text accompanying note 383. R
389. See supra text accompanying notes 108–10, 118–21; see also Dow, supra note 382, at R
646–47 (explaining the fraud exception to the doctrine of successor liability).
390. See supra note 382. R
391. See supra text accompanying notes 118–121; see also Dow, supra note 382, at 646–47 R
(explaining the fraud exception as “a straightforward equitable principle that negates a
successor’s attempt to secure assets with inadequate consideration”).
392. See infra Part IV.B.2.e.
393. In fact, in determining that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Dackman had
the ability to change or affect the title, the court cited only to evidence demonstrating that
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acting in the good faith service to the LLC.394  Hard Assets was created
to make a profit by buying and selling real estate.395  In accordance
with this purpose, Dackman took the following actions: executed the
deed for Hard Assets to purchase the property, signed the complaint
to have the Allens removed from the property, and signed the deed
when Hard Assets sold the property.396  Unlike the members in Resheff
who acted with motives other than to benefit the LLC, there is no
evidence in this case that Dackman took any actions opposed to the
interest of the LLC.397
Second, there is no evidence to show that Dackman ever acted to
impair the business of a third party for the profit of the LLC or him-
self.  Dackman fulfilled all the LLC’s obligations when Hard Assets
bought and subsequently sold the property in question.398  Dackman
never acted to impair any business of the Allens.399  The Allens were
in fact illegal occupants of the property of whom Dackman had no
knowledge.400  When Dackman was made aware of the Allens he took
action to enforce the LLC’s property rights by having the Allens law-
fully removed by way of court order.401
The court should properly balance the competing interests of
tort and corporate law by adopting a rule under which the MLLCA
protects members from liability when acting in the good faith service
of the LLC.402  On the one hand, protecting only the interest of tort
Dackman successfully ran the day-to-day operations of Hard Assets.  Allen v. Dackman, 413
Md. 132, 149, 991 A.2d 1216, 1226 (2010).
394. The evidence demonstrated that Dackman executed the deed for the LLC to buy
the property, executed the deed when the LLC could make a profit by selling the property,
and protected the LLC’s property rights by signing the complaint to have the Allens re-
moved from the property. See id.
395. See supra note 11 (explaining that Hard Assets was in the business of “flipping” real R
estate).
396. Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226.
397. Compare supra notes 393–94 and accompanying text, with Resheff, Inc. v. 970 Kent R
Ave. Assocs., LLC, No. 40337/07, 2009 WL 175039, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009)
(explaining that the members of the LLC were acting with motives other than to benefit
the LLC).
398. Allen, 413 Md. at 149, 991 A.2d at 1226.
399. In fact, when Hard Assets acquired the property, none of its members knew Ms.
Allen and her children were living at the premises. See supra text accompanying note 13. R
While the Allens were living at the premises, the LLC never received or attempted to col-
lect rent. See supra text accompanying note 17.  During this period, Dackman was in R
charge of the LLC’s day-to-day operations. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20. R
400. See supra text accompanying note 19. R
401. See supra text accompanying notes 14–16. R
402. See supra Part IV.B.2.a (demonstrating why protecting members from liability when
acting in the good faith service of the LLC properly balances the interest of tort and corpo-
rate law).
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law, by always imposing personal liability on members of an LLC, will
disincentivize business growth and development.403  On the other
hand, protecting only the interest of corporate law, by never imposing
personal liability on members of an LLC, will encourage unnecessarily
risky and tortious conduct.404  The tightrope that needs to be walked
by the court is to find a way that encourages business development but
not tortious conduct.  In this case, the MLLCA should protect
Dackman from personal liability because Dackman was acting in the
good faith service of the LLC, acting neither in a manner opposed to
the LLC’s interest nor in a manner that impairs the business of a third
party.
C. The Court Should Not Pierce the Veil of Hard Assets, LLC
Even if a member of an LLC is protected under the MLLCA, the
court should still hold that member personally liable, under the ap-
propriate circumstances, by piercing the veil of the LLC.  Maryland
courts should apply the long settled doctrine of piercing the corpo-
rate veil to the liability shield of LLCs.405  Applying the doctrine to this
case, the veil of Hard Assets should not be pierced.406
1. The Court Should Apply the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil
to LLCs
Jurisdictions that have considered whether to apply the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil to an LLC have held that the doctrine
applies equally to LLCs.407  Maryland courts should apply this same
reasoning to adopt the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to
LLCs.408  Similar to the Delaware LLC statute at issue in Westmeyer v.
Flynn, the MLLCA was designed to provide for the creation of a single
business entity that possessed the tax benefits of a partnership and the
limited liability of a corporation.409  This clear purpose for the forma-
403. See generally supra Part IV.B.2.b.
404. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 559–60
(1985) (“Many commentators have tried to justify tort law on the ground that it promotes
socially desirable behavior. Specifically, they claim that it prevents injuries by deterring
unreasonably dangerous conduct.” (footnote omitted)).
405. See infra Part IV.C.1.
406. See infra Part IV.C.2.
407. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the jurisdictions and reasoning in which the doc-
trine of piercing the corporate veil has been applied to LLCs).
408. See generally supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text (exploring other states that R
have favorably considered this approach).
409. Compare Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“‘[The Dela-
ware Act] is designed to achieve what is seemingly a simple concept—to permit persons or
entities (“members”) to join together in an environment of private ordering to form and
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tion of an LLC leads to the logical conclusion that for liability pur-
poses, an LLC should be treated in the same manner as a
corporation.410  Like a corporation, the LLC was designed to protect
its members from liability by creating an independent legal entity.411
Members of an LLC are not generally liable for the obligations of the
LLC.412  The liability shield of the LLC, however, is not absolute, and
the veil of the LLC may be appropriately pierced under the criteria of
the well-settled doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.413
2. The Veil of Hard Assets Should Not Be Pierced
Applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to LLCs,
however, the veil of Hard Assets should not be pierced here.  Piercing
the veil of a Maryland LLC is appropriate in two circumstances: (1)
where the member has committed fraud or (2) where paramount eq-
uity demands the imposition of personal liability.414  Maryland law has
proven to be much more restrictive than other states in allowing
courts to pierce through a business entity’s veil.415  The facts of this
case are not sufficient to pierce the veil of Hard Assets because (1)
there is no evidence that Hard Assets or Dackman ever committed
fraud and (2) there is no evidence to establish the level of necessity
required to pierce the veil based on paramount equity.416
a. There Is No Evidence That Hard Assets or Dackman Committed
Fraud
The court should not pierce the veil of Hard Assets based on
fraud.  To prove fraud, the defendant must at the very least have made
some material representation that was false, have known the statement
was false, and have meant the statement to defraud, and the plaintiff
operate the enterprise under an LLC agreement with tax benefits akin to a partnership
and limited liability akin to the corporate form.’” (quoting Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v.
Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999))), with supra Part II.B.2. (explaining that the MLLCA
was designed to provide for a liability shield and favorable tax treatment).
410. Westmeyer, 889 N.E.2d at 677.
411. Troutwine Estates Dev. Co. v. Comsub Design & Eng’g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 898
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
412. Westmeyer, 889 N.E.2d at 678 (“Just as with a corporation, the members of an LLC
are not generally liable for the obligations of the LLC.”).
413. Id.
414. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md.
App. 294, 306–07, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999); see supra Part II.C.3.
415. Residential Warranty, 126 Md. App. at 309–10, 728 A.2d at 790–91.
416. See infra Part IV.C.2.a–b.
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must have justifiably relied on the false statement and suffered
harm.417
The burden of proof for alleging fraud falls on the plaintiff to
allege clear and sufficient facts that show in detail the defendant’s
fraud.418  In this case, there is no evidence that either Hard Assets or
Dackman ever made a false material representation.419  There is actu-
ally no evidence to show that Hard Assets or Dackman made any rep-
resentations to the plaintiffs at all.420  Even if some representation
could be shown by the plaintiffs, there is no evidence that Hard Assets
or Dackman ever intended to defraud anyone, that the plaintiffs justi-
fiably relied on any representations, or that the plaintiffs were injured
by any representation.421  The facts alleged in this case are clearly lack-
ing to establish fraud on the part of Hard Assets or Dackman, and
thus the veil of Hard Assets should not be pierced based on fraud.
b. There Is No Evidence That Shows a Necessity to Pierce the LLC
Veil Based on Paramount Equity
The court should not pierce the veil of Hard Assets based on the
necessity of paramount equity.  To create the necessity of paramount
equity in Maryland, it must first be shown that a single individual owns
substantially all the company’s stock.422  It must then be shown that
one of several additional factors exists: undercapitalization, failure to
recognize the corporate form, commingling of funds, nonfunctioning
417. Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 428, 401 A.2d 480, 484–85 (1979).
418. Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 367, 76 A.2d 566, 570 (1950) (“[T]he bur-
den of proof is on the one charging fraud to establish by clear, specific acts, facts that in
law constitute fraud.”).
419. See generally Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 139–40, 991 A.2d 1216, 1220 (2010)
(“‘Ms. Allen did not speak to Hard Assets or its representatives, and was not aware of who
Hard Assets was.  Similarly, Monica D. Allen did not know Hard Assets or [Respondent].’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Dackman, 184 Md. App. 1, 5, 964 A.2d 210, 212
(2009))).
420. See generally id.
421. Compare Colandrea, 42 Md. App. at 422–24, 428–32, 401 A.2d at 481–82, 484–86
(“Given the pervasive presence of fraud in this case, we conclude that the chancellor erred
in refusing to disregard the corporate entity of Cortland Realty, Ltd. and impose personal
liability on the promissory notes upon the perpetrator of the fraud, Mrs. Colandrea.”), with
Allen, 413 Md. at 138–41, 991 A.2d at 1219–21 (explaining that Hard Assets bought the
property with the intention of immediately reselling it, never intended to lease the prop-
erty, never collected rent for the property, and the Allens were occupying the premises
illegally).
422. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md.
App. 294, 307, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999) (quoting Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123, 158–59, 603 A.2d 1301, 1318 (1992)).
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officers, insolvency, or absence of corporate records.423  Although Ma-
ryland law allows for the piercing of the corporate veil based on para-
mount equity, no Maryland court has ever used it.424
The facts of this case are not sufficient to justify piercing the veil
of Hard Assets based on paramount equity.  Based on the facts before
the Maryland appellate courts, it is not clear that Dackman owned
substantially all of the stock of Hard Assets.425  Even assuming that
Dackman did own substantially all of the stock, the plaintiffs have still
failed to prove a necessity to pierce the corporate veil based on para-
mount equity.  First, no evidence before the appellate courts showed
that the corporation was undercapitalized, failed to recognize the cor-
porate form, failed to issue stock, or operated with a loss;426 Hard As-
sets was in the business of flipping houses for a profit and possessed
enough capital to purchase the property in question.427  Likewise,
there was no evidence before the appellate courts that (1) Dackman
commingled the funds and assets of Hard Assets with his own personal
funds; (2) there were nonfunctioning officers or directors, (3) Hard
Assets was insolvent; or (4) Hard Assets lacked corporate records.428
There was simply no evidence before the appellate courts to show that
Dackman “exercised such complete domination over [Hard Assets] to
warrant a conclusion that the corporation ‘had no separate mind, will
or existence of its own.’”429  Thus, the veil of Hard Assets should not
be pierced based on a necessity of paramount equity.
V. CONCLUSION
In Allen v. Dackman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
an individual member of an LLC could be personally liable under the
Housing Code because the trier of fact could find that the member
was the “owner” of property by having the ability to change or affect
the title and “personally committed, inspired, or participated” in the
alleged tort.430  The court jeopardized the existence of the critical lim-
423. See Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 378 Md. 724, 735–36, 838 A.2d 1204, 1210
(2003) (listing “factors commonly considered” by courts when deciding to apply the doc-
trine); Residential Warranty Corp., 126 Md. App. at 307, 728 A.2d at 789.
424. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. R
425. The Court of Appeals explained only that Dackman was one of two members of
Hard Assets.  See Allen, 413 Md. at 139, 991 A.2d at 1220.
426. See id. at 135–41, 991 A.2d at 1218–21 (laying out the facts in the case without
mentioning these factors).
427. See supra note 11. R
428. See supra note 426. R
429. Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 378 Md. 724, 736, 838 A.2d 1204, 1211 (2003).
430. Allen, 413 Md. at 141–42, 145, 991 A.2d at 1221, 1223–24.
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ited liability of an LLC by imposing personal liability on members for
the obligations of the LLC.431  The court could have properly held
individuals accountable for their tortious conduct and respected the
liability shield by examining Dackman’s potential liability under a
three step analysis: (1) whether Dackman possessed the legal ability to
change or affect title,432 (2) whether Dackman acted in the good faith
service of Hard Assets,433 and (3) whether the veil of Hard Assets
should be pierced.434  If a member of an LLC fails any part of this
analysis, then personal liability should apply.435  While this reasoning
would have resulted in a different outcome in the current case, this
analysis properly weighs the competing interests and would hold an
LLC member personally liable in the appropriate cases.436
431. See supra Part IV.
432. See supra Part IV.A.
433. See supra Part IV.B.
434. See supra Part IV.C.
435. See supra Part IV.
436. See supra Part IV.
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